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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays examining tiered market structures.  We focus on 
the June 2006 restructuring of the NASDAQ Stock Exchange where the listing environment 
changed from two to three tiers, creating a top tier with the highest listing standards for any 
exchange in the world.  The first essay examines market quality.  Theoretical motivation 
indicates that different listing and disclosure requirements could result in different levels of 
information production across tiers, and thus different market quality characteristics.  While we 
do find cross-sectional evidence of market quality differences, we do not find evidence of market 
quality changes when firms change tiers.  Within the NASDAQ trading environment, this result 
is consistent with a visibility effect, where better (lesser) known stocks are more (less) liquid due 
to higher levels of investor participation.  With the exception of increased effective spreads as 
firms drop to a lower tier, no other short-term changes in market quality appear to result from 
firms adhering to new listing standards, when controlling for disclosure standards.   
The second essay examines any reputation effect resulting from NASDAQ’s tiered structure.  
Theoretical motivation indicates that exchanges choose listing and disclosure standards to 
maximize the combination of its reputation value and the value of cash flows from listing and 
trading fees.  We find that NASDAQ’s 2006 restructuring did not appear to enhance its 
reputation, either directly or indirectly.  The restructuring did not result in any positive 
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announcement effect for NASDAQ firms.  Further, we find little evidence to support any 
announcement effects as firms cross into new tiers.  Lastly, we find that the restructuring does 
not appear to have helped NASDAQ become more competitive in the marketplace for attracting 
new initial public offerings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On February 15, 2006, NASDAQ announced the creation of a new market tier for 
publicly traded companies on the NASDAQ Stock Market.  The newest tier, named the 
“NASDAQ Global Select Market,” would have financial and liquidity requirements 
higher than any other market in the world.  On June 26, 2006, a subsequent NASDAQ 
announcement specified the approximately 1,200 companies that qualified for the new 
market tier.  Less than one week later, on July 3, 2006, the new listing structure took 
effect.   
Bob Greifeld, NASDAQ President and Chief Executive Officer, promoted the 
new tier as “a blue chip market for blue chip companies.”  His announcement implies, at 
least in some manner, that NASDAQ’s intent was to create a new, unique marketplace for 
blue chip companies.  On the other hand, an article in MarketWatch pronounced that the 
new tier “means little” to investors (Jaffe, 2006).  Furthermore, the article went on to 
state “the NASDAQ's designations are transparent and ultimately have more to do with 
marketing than markets (Jaffe, 2006).”  Ultimately, whether or not NASDAQ’s creation 
of the Global Select Market (GSM) represents the creation of a new trading environment, 
or is simply a meaningless re-designation of a pre-existing environment meant to enhance 
NASDAQ’s reputation, is an empirical question.   
Moreover, the creation of the new market tier leads to some interesting research 
questions.  Why do tiered markets exist?  Do exchanges create tiers in order to fill a need 
(or serve a niche) not currently served in the marketplace?  Are the tiers uniquely 
different, or are their market frictions similar, and differ only through a “scale effect?”  If 
uniquely different, what are the sources of these differences?  Do exchanges create tiered 
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structures as a competitive reaction in the market for listings?  If so, how does a tiered 
structure help an exchange become more competitive? 
From an economic perspective, does the existence of tiered markets somehow 
represent a competitive response to maximize utility for an exchange?  Jickling (2007) 
provides evidence that NASDAQ’s listings have dropped 39% during the 1995-2006 
timeframe.  If tiered structures assist in attracting new listings (which produce higher 
listing fees) or new traders (which produce more commissions on trading volume), a 
tiered structure would maximize NASDAQ shareholders’ wealth.  Is the recent 
restructuring a response to a decade of declining listings, designed to maximize 
NASDAQ shareholders’ wealth?  More importantly, did it increase shareholder wealth? 
The tiered restructuring presents an opportunity to conduct an empirical 
examination of NASDAQ’s tiered market structure.  If the tiers operate as unique trading 
environments, where the tiers exhibit material differences in trading frictions, this finding 
would provide support to a unique markets hypothesis, where Bob Greifeld’s promotion 
of the new tier as “a blue chip market for blue chip companies” could be viewed as a 
legitimate attempt by NASDAQ to fill a perceived void (or serve a niche) in the 
marketplace for trading assets of blue chip companies.   
Alternatively, if material differences are non-existent between the trading 
environments, this finding would support a reputation hypothesis.  Chuck Jaffe’s 
assertion that the new tier would “have more to do with marketing than markets” would 
posit that the real intent of Bob Greifeld’s statement was that the GSM is “a blue chip 
market for blue chip companies.”  NASDAQ would appear to be outwardly marketing the 
merits of the newest tier for a reputation effect, when the trading environment would 
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exhibit similar trading frictions as the lower tiers.  Further, the distinctions between the 
tiers would be arbitrary boundaries, drawn up by NASDAQ, meaning little to the average 
investor or prospective listing firm.   
NASDAQ’s tiered design enables multiple methods of empirical analysis.  First, 
the tiers represent an opportunity to conduct a cross-sectional examination as different 
listing standards are applied to stocks that are all listed on the same exchange and trade 
on the same set of regional exchanges and alternative trading systems.  Additionally, the 
tiered design allows for examining any potential impact when stocks migrate between 
tiers.  An event study can be conducted when stocks cross these boundaries.  Finally, the 
restructuring allows for an event study examining the effects of applying a new set of 
standards to existing stocks (i.e. re-designating stocks in a static setting, as opposed to 
stocks moving from one designation into another).   
This dissertation examines NASDAQ’s tiered structure.  Essay One examines 
whether or not tiered structures are attempts to create unique trading environments by 
focusing on market quality characteristics for each tier.  First, I examine a cross-section 
of market quality characteristics across market tiers.  Next, I conduct a temporal 
examination when stocks migrate across tiers in order to identify any short-term changes 
in market quality.  If significant differences exist, some firms could be at a competitive 
disadvantage because their cost of capital will be higher in one setting due to the 
differences in trading frictions.  Potential differences in market quality would help 
explain firm decisions on moving up to a higher tier, down to a lower tier, conducting 
reverse stock splits, staying in place, or even changing the exchange on which they’re 
listed. 
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Essay Two examines if tiered structures are an attempt by an exchange to enhance 
their reputation.  Essay Two first determines whether NASDAQ had any indirect 
reputation effect resulting from the restructuring by determining whether or not any 
NASDAQ-listed stocks experienced positive abnormal returns around the time frame of 
the restructuring.  The second part of the essay examines if the restructuring enhances 
NASDAQ’s competitiveness in the marketplace for new listings by focusing on any 
impact on its ability to compete for new IPO listings with other U.S. exchanges.     
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ESSAY ONE 
 
 
 
UNIQUE MARKETS?  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARKET QUALITY 
ACROSS THE NASDAQ TIERS. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
NASDAQ’s July 2006 restructuring resulted in a two-tiered marketplace being 
further subdivided into three tiers.  In the case of NASDAQ’s market structure, the 
creation of the newest tier could be viewed as an attempt to create a new trading 
environment.  If the listing and disclosure requirements of a new tier result in the 
production of more precise information (resulting in better market quality for assets 
traded on that tier), and materially different types of firms being attracted to the tier as a 
result of this higher transparency, the new tier could be viewed a unique trading 
environment.  This essay focuses on market quality differences across the tiers. 
NASDAQ’s tiered structure is by no means a unique phenomenon in the 
marketplace for trading securities.  Within the U.S., the Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX) 
maintains a two-tiered structure.  The Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) also 
maintained a two-tiered structure up until their 2007 acquisition by NASDAQ.  
Additionally, in March of 2006 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) created a tiered 
market setting with the establishment of the NYSE Arca, a new trading venue created 
after the NYSE-Archipelago merger was approved in December of 2005.  The NYSE 
Arca provided smaller public companies (those not meeting the NYSE listing 
requirements) an opportunity to list with the NYSE Group. 
However, these exchanges differ from NASDAQ in two important ways.  First, 
the scale of the NASDAQ listing environment is much larger than NYSE Arca, CHX, 
and PHLX.  NASDAQ is the primary listing exchange for over 3,000 firms.  By 
comparison, as of the end of 2008, NYSE Arca had only 50 total listings, and CHX only 
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88 listings.  Additionally, many of the CHX firms are dual-listed and have a primary 
listing on a different exchange.  NYSE Arca is the primary listing exchange for only 33 
of its 50 firms.  CHX is the primary for only 2 of their 88.  Since NASDAQ did not have 
a dual-listing program until 2004, only 11 of the 3,000+ NASDAQ-listed firms are dual-
listed. 
The second major difference is the distribution of listed firms across the tiers.  
NASDAQ-listed stocks are somewhat evenly distributed across the NASDAQ tiers, with 
each tier having significant representation (currently 1,222 on the Global Select, 1,116 on 
the Global, and 497 on the Capital).  NYSE Arca and CHX have the vast majority of their 
stocks listed on their highest tiers (84% and 94%, respectively).   
More recently, Pink Sheets, LLC developed a two-tiered listing service for over-
the-counter securities called OTCQX.  Pink Sheets designed this listing service primarily 
for a) existing OTC-traded domestic companies seeking premium status, b) smaller 
companies currently listed on a national exchange that are voluntarily delisting but still 
desiring secondary market liquidity and transparency, c) venture-backed growth 
companies who do not yet qualify for an exchange listing, and d) foreign-listed 
companies seeking access to the U.S. equity markets.   
Pink Sheets has two tiers.  The higher tier, called the PremierQX, is for issuers of 
size and quality adequate for listing on a national stock exchange.  The lower tier, called 
the PrimeQX, is for issuers with audited financials, but not of sufficient size to be listed 
on the PremierQX.  Combined, these two tiers will consist of approximately 25% of the 
stocks formerly traded on both the OTCBB and Pink Sheets.   
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Outside of the U.S., a number of prominent exchanges operate tiered listing 
structures similar to NASDAQ and OTCQX.  For example, the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) operates a main market for established companies and the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) for small international companies.  The AIM is unique among trading 
environments in that it essentially has no listing requirements.  AIM does not require 
companies to have a particular financial track record or trading history, and no minimum 
requirements exist on the AIM for firm size or the number of shareholders (London Stock 
Exchange, 2008).   
Similarly, the TSX Group in Canada operates a two-tiered marketplace.  The 
Toronto Stock Exchange is the tier for well-managed, larger companies, but the Toronto 
Stock Exchange also lists a number of exchange-traded funds, income trusts, and 
investment funds.  The TSX Venture Exchange is a tier for emerging companies (Toronto 
Stock Exchange, 2008).  The TSX Venture Exchange, formerly known as the Canadian 
Venture Exchange, provides the capital-raising infrastructure for small and medium-size 
firms.   
Other examples of foreign exchanges with tiered structures include the Frankfurt 
Wertpapierbörse (FSE) and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).  The FSE operates 
two official market segments, and a third “unofficial” tier (called the Open Market) that 
does not represent an organized or regulated market (Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse, 2008).  
Lastly, the JSE operates three tiers consisting of their Main Board, a Venture Capital 
Market, and a Development Capital Market (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2008).   
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In my analysis of the NASDAQ market structure, the findings are not consistent 
with the idea that the NASDAQ’s tiered listing environment represents the creation of 
unique trading environments between the tiers.   While I do find market quality 
differences among the tiers in the cross-section analysis, the differences appear to result 
either from a long-term effect due to disclosure requirements or a visibility effect, rather 
than simply from new listing standards being applied.   
A short-term analysis of immediate changes in market quality fails to detect any 
material changes in the 20 trading days immediately after a firm switches tiers.  This 
short-term trading period represents the time frame when the new listing standards are 
being applied to the firms, and the information contained within those listing standards is 
being revealed to the investing public for their use in more accurately pricing those 
stocks.  If a long-term impact does exist (which is not tested in this essay), the impact 
could result from the disclosure process and/or from a visibility effect.  The evidence is 
consistent with the notion that as firms become better known by investors, additional 
institutional trading and analyst coverage make trading in those assets more transparent, 
thereby resulting in market quality differences between the NASDAQ tiers.     
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CHAPTER 2 
NASDAQ STRUCTURE 
 
 
On July 3, 2006, the NASDAQ Stock Exchange listed over 3,000 companies 
(down to 2,835 at the end of 2008).  The companies are divided over NASDAQ’s three 
tiers, with each tier’s composition being distinguished by its initial and continued listing 
requirements.  Firms are required to meet the initial listing requirements, and to maintain 
the continued listing requirements, in order to be included on a specific tier.  The Global 
Select Market has the highest listing requirements, followed by the Global Market, and 
then the Capital Market.  The distribution of stocks across the NASDAQ tiers is shown in 
Table 1-1. 
This current structure results from a 2006 restructuring in which NASDAQ 
created a third tier with the "highest listing standards in the world” (NASDAQ Press 
Release, 2006).  The newest tier resulted from NASDAQ subdividing their formerly 
named NASDAQ National Market into the new Global and Global Select Markets.  
Meanwhile, the NASDAQ Smallcap Market was simply renamed the NASDAQ Capital 
Market.   
NASDAQ specifies the characteristics that distinguish the three tiers of stocks in 
their NASDAQ Listing Requirements.  The listing requirements identify the financial and 
liquidity characteristics required for trading on a specific tier.  Appendices A and B 
provide the initial and continued listing standards for each tier at the time of the 
restructuring.  Each trading day, when companies fail to meet a listing requirement, 
NASDAQ posts a list of non-compliant companies on its website.  The listing indicates 
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the issuer name, the listing deficiency, the market on which the asset trades and the date 
NASDAQ initially notified the firm of the delinquency. 
NASDAQ does not have its own unique disclosure requirements.  While 
disclosure requirements are outlined in the NASDAQ Listing Rules, NASDAQ enforces 
the routine reporting requirements of the Exchange Act and the disclosure requirements 
of Regulation FD.  Private conversations with NASDAQ indicate that their exchange 
enforces these reporting and disclosure requirements for NASDAQ-listed firms.   
NASDAQ has a team of analysts responsible for policing the reporting and 
disclosure of firms listed on their exchange.  Each of their analysts is assigned up to 200 
firms to monitor.  The analysts are responsible for verifying that firms meet, and continue 
to meet, the initial and continued listing requirements for the tier to which they are 
assigned.  Additionally, analysts monitor when the listed firms are required to disclose 
routine information such as quarterly and annual reports, earnings and dividend 
announcements, etc.   
Whenever the company fails to meet a mandated disclosure timeline, the analysts 
are responsible for notifying the listed firm to inquire into the nature of the delay.  
NASDAQ may require the firm to conduct a press release notifying investors of the 
delay, as well as disclosing any information about the delay that may be material in 
accurately pricing their stock trading on NASDAQ.  If the firm fails to comply, 
NASDAQ could take measures ranging from initiating/extending trading halts to 
delisting the firm. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
 
 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) propose a theoretical framework that may 
explain the presence of tiered market structures.  Exchanges use disclosure and listing 
standards as a means to aid investors in the production of information that is useful in 
accurately pricing assets traded in their marketplace.  Listing standards enable exchanges 
to screen potential listings for their exchange, and to apply stringency when investigating 
and enforcing disclosure requirements of those listed firms.   
In the case of NASDAQ, the disclosure and listing standards provide the public 
information on each firm’s size, earning power, and governance, as well as the overall 
level of public interest in the firm’s stock.  As a result, the listing and disclosure 
requirements help a) monitor listing firms and b) enhance the precision of information 
made available to outsiders when evaluating those firms.  Thus, NASDAQ’s listing and 
disclosure requirements may enhance the precision of information made available to 
outsiders when evaluating NASDAQ-listed firms, and could result in more a transparent 
marketplace.     
Higher listing and disclosure standards do come at a cost to the exchange though.  
If the exchange sets high listing standards, the exchange reduces the number of firms that 
will qualify for listing.  This smaller pool of potential firms reduces the expected cash 
flows (from the listing fees) that serve as a major source of revenue for the exchange.  
Additionally, the smaller number of qualifying firms reduces the revenue generated 
through individual transactions in the marketplace as assets exchange hands (Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri, 2006; Easley and O’Hara, 2007).  Likewise, higher disclosure standards 
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may cause the exchange to incur “greater verification and regulatory costs to verify and 
regulate disclosures made by these firms (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2006).” 
Within this context, the exchange faces a trade-off between a) the value resulting 
from a higher reputation and b) the value of expected cash flows from firms listing on the 
exchange.  The optimal listing standards would maximize the combination of these two 
offsetting values.  Figure 1-1 shows this relation. 
Under Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s theoretical framework, the creation of a new 
tier could be treated as the creation of a new trading environment.  If the listing and 
disclosure requirements of a new tier attract materially different types of firms to each 
tier, and distinctly different liquidity and transparency characteristics when compared to 
pre-existing tiers, the new tier could be viewed as a unique trading environment resulting 
in true differences in market quality.  In this case, the unique trading environment could 
result in market quality differences such as transaction costs, order flow patterns, price 
discovery, and price efficiency.  This “Unique Markets Hypothesis” may explain 
NASDAQ’s motivation for a tiered market structure.   
While Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s framework addresses both disclosure and 
listing requirements, prior research focused solely on the relationship between disclosure 
and liquidity.  Welker (1995), Healy et al. (1999), and Leuz and Verrechia (2000) all find 
positive relationships between disclosure and liquidity, but their studies focus solely on 
transaction costs.  Heflin et al. (2005) also find a positive relationship between disclosure 
and liquidity.  Their study further examines the disclosure-liquidity relationship by 
examining both transaction costs and depth.  
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Frost and Botosan (1997) study the relationship between the disclosure 
environment and liquidity of non-US firms listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, and the OTCBB 
from 1994-1996.  While they find that less regulation and fewer disclosure requirements 
result in lower liquidity, their study has a joint hypothesis problem.  Their study fails to 
isolate the liquidity effects resulting from a) regulation/disclosure requirements, b) listing 
requirements, and c) the effects of three different market microstructure environments.  
Frost et al. (2006) examine the relationship between disclosure requirements and liquidity 
in 50 exchanges around the world.  They find that stronger disclosure systems are related 
to higher levels of liquidity.  This study also suffers from a joint hypothesis problem in 
that the 50 exchanges have both different trading environments and different listing 
requirements.      
Chavez and Silva (2006) study the liquidity impact when the Sao Paulo Stock 
Exchange created three special listing segments where firms could choose to voluntarily 
adhere to progressively higher corporate governance rules, above and beyond the 
requirements set forth by current legislation in Brazil.  While corporate governance rules 
are distinctly different from disclosure rules, the strictest segment of the Sao Paulo Stock 
Exchange, the Novo Mercado, requires firms to have financial statements prepared in 
accordance with International Accounting Standards or GAAP.  This requirement results 
in the Novo Mercado having higher disclosure standards than the other two special 
segments.   
Their study finds that liquidity increases (i.e. transaction costs decreased) when 
firms move onto the special segments.  This study also has a joint hypothesis problem in 
that it did not take into consideration any potential visibility effects when firms elect to 
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move onto the special listing segments.  Moreover, the study consists of only 62 firms, 
and it did not test for any liquidity changes for the firms choosing not to list in the special 
segments. 
While Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s framework does not propose separate effects 
for listing requirements versus disclosure requirements, Draus (2009) proposes a separate 
framework where an exchange can improve the liquidity of assets which trade on its 
exchange by tightening its listing requirements.  The tightening of listing requirements 
reduces information asymmetry about a firm and increases the firm’s liquidity.  The 
reduced asymmetry and higher liquidity lead to higher levels of investor participation for 
the firm’s assets in the marketplace, as investors seek to trade in locations where the 
expected utility from participating exceeds the opportunity costs of participating.  Draus’ 
theoretical model focuses on the initial listing decision of firms, where the initial listing 
and disclosure requirements occur simultaneously.  Thus, the framework also fails to 
propose separate effects for listing requirements versus disclosure requirements. 
Lastly, Merton’s (1997) investor attention hypothesis provides an alternate, but 
not mutually exclusive, scenario where the different NASDAQ tiers may produce varying 
levels of investor knowledge about securities.  Consequently, as investor participation 
differs across tiers, the liquidity of assets on those tiers may vary.  This visibility effect 
could be present regardless of whether or not any listing and/or disclosure effect occurs.   
Using these theoretical motivations, this essay contributes to the literature by 
focusing on the relationship between listing standards and market quality.  NASDAQ’s 
unique, tiered structure allows for a natural experiment where any potential liquidity 
16 
 
effect resulting from listing standards can be isolated, while controlling for other possible 
explanations.   
Using firms listed on NASDAQ’s tiered structure ensures that all stocks trade on 
similar market structures (e.g. such as dealer vs. auction, floor-based vs. electronic, or 
quote vs. order-driven).  The tiers have the same trading rules, such as short-sale price 
tests, different treatment of limit orders, or opening/closing procedures.  Though 
participation levels may vary across tiers, all NASDAQ tiers have the same potential 
competitors for order flow, such as alternative trading systems and regional exchanges, 
through unlisted trading privileges.   
The only distinguishable trading rule that differs among the tiers is the “bid-test” 
rule for short sales.  The bid-test, implemented in 1994 and eliminated in 2007, restricted 
short-selling when the current inside bid price is lower than the previous inside bid price.  
After NASDAQ’s restructuring, orders for Global Select Market (GSM) and the 
NASDAQ Global Market (NGM) stocks adhered to the bid-test rule from July 2006 until 
Oct 2007, whereas orders for NASDAQ Capital Market (NCM) stocks were exempt from 
the bid-test rule.   
In addition, the bid-test rule only applied to GSM and GS trades that occurred on 
NASDAQ.  The regional exchanges and alternative trading systems that compete for 
order flow in NASDAQ stocks are not required to abide by the bid-test rule.  A review of 
the trading rules for regional exchanges and alternative trading systems indicates these 
markets did not have their own bid-test rule in place (or any other rules that distinguish 
trading activities between NASDAQ’s tiers). 
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McCormick and Reilly (1996) examine the economic impact of NASDAQ’s bid-
test rule on market quality by examining short-selling activity of market participants on 
NASDAQ National Market stocks (now GSM and NGM).  They find more short-selling 
during upward price movements than during downward price movements, thereby 
implying that the bid-test rule reduces short-selling during price declines.  However, they 
do not find market quality differences between short sales on up-bids and down-bids, nor 
do they find differences between exempt and non-exempt short sales.  As a result, they 
conclude that the bid-test rule reduces short-selling activity during price declines without 
decreasing market quality.  A follow-on study by McCormick and Zeigler (1997), using 
different proxies for market quality, validate the findings of McCormick and Reilly 
(1996).  They also find that market participants rarely use their bid-test exemption. 
Ferri, Cristophe, and Angel (2004) study the bid-test rule and find that the bid test 
has little effect on short order execution.  They find that SmallCap (now NCM) stocks 
have less short selling than National Market stocks (now GSM and NGM), even though 
they are not constrained by the bid-test rule.  Additionally, they find that abnormal short 
selling in SmallCap stocks (no bid-test constraint) does not result in more price declines 
than with matching National Market stocks (bid-test constrained).  Thus, the absence of a 
bid-test, even when combined with abnormal short selling, doesn't materially impact 
market quality. 
Recent studies on Regulation SHO, the SEC’s temporary suspension of price-tests 
(for a set of pilot securities) during the period of May 2, 2005 to April 28, 2006, indicate 
that the bid-test has little to no impact on NASDAQ’s market quality.  In an analysis of 
short trades on NASDAQ, Alexander and Peterson (2008) find that the bid test is 
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“relatively inconsequential” and does not materially degrade market quality on 
NASDAQ.  Another study indicates that NASDAQ’s bid-test impact on market quality 
can be largely attributed to the distortions in order flow created by the price-tests 
(Diether, et al, 2009).  Thus, the only trading rule difference among the tiers appears to 
have little to no impact on making the tiers unique. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESES 
 
 
All three NASDAQ tiers have the same disclosure requirements, trade in the same 
market structure, under virtually the same trading rules, and on the same mix of 
marketplaces (through unlisted trading privileges).  At first glance, it does not appear as if 
NASDAQ uses a tiered structure to create unique trading environments, and especially 
for the purpose of filling any void in the marketplace.  On the other hand, NASDAQ’s 
tiers have similar, but not identical, listing requirements.   
Under the theoretical framework of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006), the 
different listing requirements for each tier may attract different types of firms, thereby 
resulting in different levels of information being revealed as different types of firms are 
attracted to each tier.  Likewise, the “continued listing” requirements may also result in 
different levels of transparency.  As firms routinely disclose information along these 
continued listing characteristics (in order to maintain their status within a tier), 
information is regularly produced.  These disclosures may lead to different transparency 
characteristics.   
This essay first conducts a cross-sectional analysis, and then a temporal analysis 
as stocks move to a different tier (facing different listing standards) within the same 
trading environment.  Thus, the following null and alternate hypotheses are tested: 
 
H0:  The NASDAQ tiers exhibit the same market quality characteristics (i.e. 
they are not unique markets). 
 
HA1:  The NASDAQ tiers exhibit different market quality characteristics (i.e. 
they are unique markets). 
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Foucault and Parlour (2004) propose an argument that implies NASDAQ’s tiers 
may be unique.  They argue that competing exchanges choose a trading structure 
(technology) and listing fees in order to maximize “its listing revenue and trading 
revenue.”  The NASDAQ tiers all use the same trading structure (a quote-driven, 
electronic, dealer market), so the trading structure shouldn’t be a source of uniqueness 
among the NASDAQ tiers under the Foucault and Parlour framework.  On the other 
hand, the “listing revenue and trading revenue,” analogous to the “value of expected cash 
flows” from firms listing on the exchange under the Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) 
framework, provides yet another possibility.   
A review of NASDAQ’s listing fee structure for both initial and continued listing 
indicates the same listing fees for the GSM and NGM, but a different fee structure for the 
NCM (both initial and continued are significantly lower).  Thus, the listing fee structure 
could be a source of market quality differences through attracting different types of firms 
that differ in how much they value a decrease in trading costs (Foucault and Parlour, 
2004).  This potential source of market quality uniqueness indicates that the NCM may 
indeed exhibit market quality differences from the GSM and the NGM, but that the GSM 
and NGM are similar (note: the listing fee structure did not change over the course of the 
sample period).  Thus, the following alternate hypothesis will also be tested:  
 
HA2:  The NASDAQ Global Select and Global Markets exhibit similar market 
quality characteristics, but exhibit different market quality characteristics 
than the Capital Market (i.e. the NCM is uniquely different from the GSM 
and NGM). 
 
21 
 
Merton’s (1987) investor attention hypothesis implies that the tiers may exhibit 
different levels of visibility since larger firms are followed by more investors than 
smaller firms.  This larger investor base could result in market quality differences due to 
different levels of investor participation.  Thus, market quality differences may result 
from factors unrelated to listing standards, or in addition to listing standards.  Therefore, 
the following hypotheses will test for any relationship between listing standards and 
liquidity, after controlling for any possible visibility effect: 
 
HA3:  After controlling for common listing characteristics and visibility 
differences, the NASDAQ tiers exhibit different market quality 
characteristics (i.e. they are unique markets). 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA SOURCES 
  
This essay uses two data sets.  The cross-sectional data set consists of all stocks 
listed on NASDAQ over the 90 calendar days immediately after the restructuring.  The 
three data sources are the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat North America database, and the Rule 605 data set. 
The CRSP database serves as the primary data source for identifying all 
NASDAQ-listed stocks, as well as to which tier they are assigned.  Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat North America database serves as a second data source.  Compustat provides 
the firm-specific data for use in evaluating firms against the NASDAQ listing 
requirements.  This portion of the data set is used to control for any listing characteristics 
common to all three NASDAQ tiers (i.e. any characteristics NASDAQ uses to artificially 
sub-divide their marketplace). 
SEC-mandated Rule 605 data serves as the third data source for the cross-
sectional dataset.  The SEC requires market centers trading NMS securities to report 
order execution quality data under the SEC’s Rule 605 of NMS (formerly known as 
Exchange Act Rule 11Ac1-5).  This data is made publicly available through the 
Transaction Auditing Group, Inc., and requires market centers to submit monthly 
electronic reports about their quality of executions on a stock-by-stock basis.  This 
portion of the data set provides the dependent variables measuring market quality.  Since 
Compustat provides quarterly data, and Rule 605 data provides monthly data, all market 
quality measures using the Rule 605 data will also require conversion to quarterly 
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measurements using both equally-weighted and value-weighted calculations.  The initial 
data set consists of 2,667 firms. 
The second data set to identify any immediate changes in market quality resulting 
from stocks moving into a new tier.  This data set consists of all stocks listed on 
NASDAQ for a 30-month period (from July 2006 until Dec 2008) after the restructuring.  
Three data sources are used to create the data set for this analysis, CRSP, the SEC’s 
EDGAR database, and the NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) database.   
CRSP is utilized to identify companies that move between tiers, and to identify 
the timeframe of the listing change.  The SEC’s EDGAR database will identify the 
implementation dates of firms moving into a new tier.  TAQ contains intraday 
transactions data (trades and quotes) used to calculate daily observations of the Rule 605 
market quality characteristics.  The second dataset consists of 158 stocks that switched 
tiers during this timeframe, with 84 rising to a higher tier, and 74 dropping to a lower tier.   
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CHAPTER 6 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Numerous measures of market quality are used in the microstructure literature, 
including such measures as spreads, depth, volatility, price impact, price efficiency, 
market efficiency, execution speed, order flow fragmentation, speed of price adjustment, 
locked/crossed markets, and market quality index (Theobald & Yallup, 2004; Bennett & 
Wi, 2006; Zhao & Chung, 2007; Eom et al, 2007; Hendershott & Jones, 2008; Alexander 
& Peterson, 2008; Shkilko et al, 2008).  Rule 605 contains market quality characteristics 
on spreads (effective and realized), rate of price improvement, amount of price 
improvement, and fragmentation of order flow.  This study focuses on these measures of 
market quality. 
For the cross-section analysis, the following measures of market quality are 
analyzed: 
1. Dependent Variables (Market Quality Characteristics): 
a. Percentage Average Effective Spread (Eff Spr): Measures the cost traders 
bear when buying or selling an asset.  Defined in Rule 605 (paragraph 
(a)(2)) as the share-weighted average of effective spreads for order 
executions, calculated for sell (buy) orders as double the amount of 
difference between the best bid and offer midpoint (execution price) at the 
time of order receipt and the execution price (midpoint).  Quarterly 
measures of the percentage average effective spread will be calculated for 
each stock using both equally and value-weighted approaches, and 
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separately for market, marketable limit, inside-the-quote limit, at-the-
quote limit, and near-the-quote limit orders. 
b. Percentage Average Realized Spread (Real Spr): Measures the revenue to 
the providers of liquidity.  Defined in Rule 605 (paragraph (a)(3)) as the 
share-weighted average of realized spreads for order executions, 
calculated for sell (buy) orders as double the amount of difference 
between the best bid and offer midpoint (execution price) five minutes 
after the time of order execution and the execution price (midpoint).  
Quarterly measures of the percentage average realized spread will be 
calculated for each stock using both equally and value-weighted 
approaches, and separately for market, marketable limit, inside-the-quote 
limit, at-the-quote limit, and near-the-quote limit orders. 
c. Price Improvement Rate (PI Rate): Measures the percentage of shares 
executed with price improvement.  Quarterly measures of the price 
improvement rate will be calculated for each stock using both equally and 
value-weighted approaches, and separately for market, marketable limit, 
inside-the-quote limit, at-the-quote limit, and near-the-quote limit orders. 
d. Price Improvement Amount (PI Amt): Measures the average amount per 
share, as a percent of share price, that prices were improved for orders 
with price improvement.  Quarterly measures of the price improvement 
amount will be calculated for each stock using both equally and value-
weighted approaches, and separately for market, marketable limit, inside-
the-quote limit, at-the-quote limit, and near-the-quote limit orders. 
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e. Order Flow Fragmentation (HHI): Measures the concentration of order 
flow across all major market centers.  Quarterly measures of order flow 
fragmentation will be calculated for each stock using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI).  The HHI will be calculated using both equally 
and value-weighted approaches, and separately for market, marketable 
limit, inside-the-quote limit, at-the-quote limit, and near-the-quote limit 
orders.  HHI is defined as:  



n
i
iSHHI
1
2  
where Si is the market share of each major market. 
Appendices A and B show the initial and continued listing standards for each tier 
in effect when NASDAQ created the NGM and GSM.  For the most part, the listing 
standards for the higher tiers simply appear to be higher thresholds along similar criteria 
used for the lower tiers.  A close look at the listing standards shows that, in almost every 
scenario, any firm meeting the listing requirements for a higher tier would also meet the 
listing requirements for any lower tier(s).   
Initially, all NASDAQ stocks appear to comprise one single population of stocks 
that meet the bare minimum NASDAQ listing standards (of the NASDAQ Capital 
Market).  The listing requirements for the upper tiers may simply create subsets of the 
overall population of NASDAQ stocks (rather than creating uniquely different sets of 
stocks).  Thus, the tiers may reflect larger, more profitable, and more liquid firms 
consolidating onto the higher tiers, whereas smaller, less profitable, and less liquid firms 
consolidating onto the lower tiers. 
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On the other hand, subtle differences do exist in the listing requirements that 
provide an opportunity to test Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s framework.  For instance, Net 
Cash Flows (from operations), Total Revenue, Total Assets, and Shareholders’ Equity are 
characteristics used for at least one tier, but not for all tiers.  Likewise, liquidity 
characteristics such as Volume and Market Value of Public Shares are not consistent 
across all tiers.  As a result, the listing standards consist of some common, and some 
unique, listing requirements.   
In order to test market quality differences across tiers resulting from the listing 
standards, I must first control for any common listing characteristics used by NASDAQ 
to subdivide the tiers.  An examination of the listing standards shows five characteristics 
that are common across tiers, where NASDAQ simply applies increasing thresholds of 
those criteria for inclusion on a higher tier.  These characteristics are stock price, number 
of registered market makers, stockholders’ equity, number of publicly held shares, and 
the market value of publicly held shares.  Since these criteria reveal the consistent 
information across tiers, they will form a vector of control variables when searching for 
true market quality differences across tiers.  
2. Vector of Control Variables –  
a. Bid Price (PRC): The bid price is the price per share at which market 
makers will purchase the stock (sourse is CRSP, “PRC”).  CRSP provides 
daily measures, so the end of period bid price will be used. 
b. Market Makers (MMCNT): The number of market makers is the number 
of registered market makers for the issue (sourse is CRSP, “MMCNT”).  
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CRSP provides daily measures, so the end of period market maker count 
will be used. 
c. Stockholders’ Equity (SE): The stockholders’ equity is the total common 
and preferred shareholders' interest in the company, and includes: capital 
surplus, common/ordinary stock, redeemable and nonredeemable preferred 
stock, retained earnings, and treasury stock (source is Compustat, 
“Stockholders' Equity - Total”).  Compustat provides quarterly measures 
of the Stockholders’ Equity for each issue, measured in millions, that 
corresponds to the period end date. 
d. Shares Outstanding (SHROUT): Represents the number of publicly held 
shares (source is CRSP, “Shares Outstanding - Adjusted”).  CRSP 
provides daily measures of the Number of Shares Outstanding, measured 
in thousands, for each issue, that corresponds to the period end date. 
e. Market Value of Public Shares (MktVal): Represents the combined market 
value of all publicly held shares, calculated by multiplying quarterly 
measures of [Bid Price * Publicly Held Shares]. 
Since NASDAQ has three tiers, the cross-section methodology will treat the middle 
tier (NGM) as the base case, and use dummy variables to capture any market quality 
differences for the upper (GSM) and lower (NCM) tiers.  If any regression coefficients 
for the variables are significantly different than zero, the coefficient will represent the 
shift upward (downward) from the base case on each market quality characteristic if the 
coefficient is positive (negative). 
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3. Variables of Interest – 
a. Global Select Market (GSM): Dummy variable equal to 1 if the stock is 
listed on the Global Select Market, and 0 otherwise. 
b. NASDAQ Capital Market (NCM): Dummy variable equal to 1 if the stock 
is listed on the NASDAQ Capital Market, and 0 otherwise. 
A finding of the variables of interest being significantly different than zero would 
provide initial support that the tiered structure of NASDAQ may result in different levels 
of market quality, even after controlling for the variables NASDAQ uses to divide their 
marketplace.  In contrast, a pattern of findings that the GSM stocks have lower spreads, 
greater levels of price improvement, and more fragmented order flow (with the converse 
for all being true for the CM) supports a scale effect. 
For further examination, I employ an event study methodology to test for changes 
in market quality when a stock moves from one tier to another (firms identified as 
changing tiers from July 2006 – Dec 2008).  A total of 158 firms switch tiers during this 
timeframe.  This event study analysis helps clarify support for or against any unique 
market characteristics as firms slide across these tier boundaries.  In essence, the cross-
section looks at all firms listed on each tier at a point in time, whereas the event study 
focuses on firms at the margins (those at the top of a lower tier, or at the bottom of a 
higher tier), as they cross from one tier onto another.  If market quality changes around 
the event day, this finding would indicate strong support for a “unique markets 
hypothesis.”  On the other hand, failure to find any market quality changes only fails to 
shows a short-term market quality impact.  It would still leave open the possibility for a 
long-term change in market quality. 
30 
 
For this analysis, I will use TAQ data to construct daily measures of the market 
quality characteristics, and then calculate equal and value-weighted averages for all firms 
on a specific tier for comparison.  The daily measures will be calculated as follows: 
 
Percent Effective Spread (EffSpread) for security i:   
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where Itrade is the trade direction indicator (1 for buys and -1 for sells) and Mi,t is the 
quote midpoint at the time of the trade.  The daily observations for each stock will be 
calculated using both equally and value-weighted measures. 
 
Percent Realized Spread (RealSpread) for security i: 
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where Itrade is the trade direction indicator (1 for buys and -1 for sells) and Mi,t+5 is the 
quote midpoint 5 minutes after the trade.  The daily observations for each stock will be 
calculated using both equally and value-weighted measures. 
 
Price Improvement Amount (PI Amt) for security i is defined as the average price 
improvement, measured as a percent of share price, for shares trading within the posted 
national best bid and ask prices at the time of execution. 
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Price Improvement Rate (PI Rate) for security i is defined as the percentage of shares 
trading within the posted national best bid and ask prices at the time of execution.  Daily 
observations will be calculated for each stock: 
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where Itrade is the trade direction indicator (1 for sells and -1 for buys), Quotei,t is the Bid 
(Ask) price for sell (buy) orders, and n is the total number of trades during the trading 
day.   
 
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index for security i is defined as the measure of order flow 
concentration across exchanges for each stock: 
2
1

 





n
i Total
i
i S
SHHI  
where S is the share volume that occurs on Market m during the trading day.   
I examine changes in market quality over the 41 trading days surrounding the tier 
change (20 days before, the event day, and 20 days after).  I use the implementation date 
as shown on CRSP, or in the SEC filings listed on the EDGAR database when CRSP data 
was missing.  I omit trades and quotes if the data indicates that they are out of time 
sequence or involve either an error or a correction.  I also omit quotes if the ask and/or 
bid prices are equal to or less than zero, and I omit any trades where the price and/or 
volume is equal to or less than zero. 
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Lastly, I test for market quality differences resulting from a visibility effect under 
Merton’s investor attention hypothesis.  I use two proxies for visibility, analyst coverage 
and institutional investing. 
4. Visibility Variables –  
a. Institutional Percent (INST): The institutional percent represents the 
percent of total volume from institutional investors, measured as volume 
in the largest trade size category (5,000-9,999 shares) in the Rule 605 data. 
b. Analysts Estimates (Analysts): The analyst estimates represents the 
number of analysts reporting earnings estimates in the Institutional 
Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database for the period of July-
September 2006. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1-2, Panel A provides a descriptive analysis on the size of NASDAQ’s 
three tiers, the types of firms listed on each, and the market quality characteristics for 
each tier.  First, note that the GSM and NGM are both over twice as large as the NCM.  
Both tiers have over 1,000 firms listed on each throughout the 90-day sample period.  In 
contrast, the NCM has fewer than 500 firms listed.  The firm characteristics indicate, as 
expected by the nature of NASDAQ’s listing characteristics, when moving from the 
lowest tier (NCM) to the highest (GSM), firms become larger, have a higher public float, 
have greater amounts of contributed capital, more dealer interest, and higher stock prices.  
When firm size is measured by the market value of publicly held shares, the average 
GSM firm is over ten times as large as a NGM firm, and almost 30 times as large as the 
average NCM stock.  Stockholders’ Equity shows a similar relationship.   
The disparity is much smaller when considering the number of registered market 
makers for each stock.  GSM stocks show, on average, only twice as many registered 
market makers as stocks on the lowest tier (NCM).  While the number of registered 
market makers indicates the quantity of market makers capable of participating in order 
flow for a particular stock, it doesn’t necessarily represent the level of active participation 
in each stock.   
Panel B shows the results of tests for differences in firm characteristics between 
the tiers.  The OLS regressions use the Global Market as the base case, with dummy 
variables distinguishing the Capital and Global Select Markets.  The analysis indicates 
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the tiers are distinguished from one another along the firm characteristics used to 
subdivide the population of NASDAQ-listed stocks.  NCM stocks are significantly lower 
priced and have fewer market makers than NGM.  GSM stocks have significantly higher 
priced stocks, more market makers, greater contributed capital (stockholders’ equity), 
larger public floats, and larger market values than NGM stocks.  All five OLS regressions 
are significant, but they explain very little of the variation in firm characteristics among 
the tiers. 
Panel C provides a descriptive analysis of the market quality characteristics across 
tiers.  The market quality characteristics obtained using the Rule 605 data indicate that, 
when moving from the lowest tier (NCM) to the highest (GSM), effective spreads fall, 
the price improvement percent decreases, the rate of price improvement decreases, and 
trading becomes more fragmented across major market centers.  The only market quality 
characteristic not showing a clear pattern of trending up or down is realized spreads.  
Realized spreads are lowest on the NCM, and highest on the NGM.   
The initial analysis indicates that the tiers exhibit a market quality tradeoff as you 
move from the lowest to the highest tier.  Effective spreads fall, indicating enhanced 
market quality.  Yet, price improvement declines and trading becomes more fragmented, 
indicating decreased market quality.  These results are consistent with the notion that as 
stocks become more heavily traded, increased competition for order flow narrows spreads 
and reduces opportunities for price improvement, both as a percent of stock price and in 
rates of occurrence.   
The initial finding of realized spreads not demonstrating a clear pattern of 
decreasing as you move from the NCM to the GSM is somewhat surprising.  The 
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descriptive analysis indicates that realized spreads are highest on the middle tier (NGM), 
and lowest on the bottom tier (NCM).  This result may indicate that quoting in stocks on 
the lowest tier may be reactive, whereas quoting in stocks on the highest tier may be 
proactive.  On the lowest tier, relatively few market makers competing for order flow 
could adjust their larger spreads after trades occur, when the competition to obtain those 
orders is relatively light.  On the other hand, market makers on the highest tier would 
have to proactively adjust their smaller spreads in order to attract order flow.  As a result, 
realized spreads would be highest in the middle of the market where trades occur frequent 
enough for prices to be relatively efficient, but not so frequently that they face high 
competition and tight spreads (at the top), or so infrequently that dealers can manage risk 
by maintaining wider spreads (at the bottom). 
To test if NASDAQ’s listing structure produces unique information across tiers, I 
must first control for any similar information being produced across tiers.  Table 1-3 
shows the results of a correlation analysis to determine if a relation exists between the 
common listing standards for all three tiers and the five measures of market quality.  The 
correlation table indicates that all five of the control variables are negatively correlated 
with the NCM dummy variable, indicating lower-priced stocks, smaller companies with 
smaller public floats, and fewer registered market makers than the base case (NGM).  All 
of the control variables are positively correlated with the GSM dummy variable, 
indicating higher-priced stocks, larger companies with larger public floats, and more 
registered market makers than the base case (NGM).  All correlations are statistically 
significant at the =.01 level of significance.  All of the control variables also show 
strong correlations with the market quality measures, with the exception of Percent 
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Realized Spreads.  Lastly, none of the control variables or variables of interest show any 
strong correlations that could pose problems with using an OLS approach (i.e. high 
multicollinearity). 
Tables 1-4 through 1-8 show the results of OLS regressions for the market quality 
variables.  Model 1 directly tests for differences in the market quality characteristics 
across tiers, without considering the vector of control variables.  The model specified is: 
 
  GSMNCMMQ ** 210  
 
With the exception of Model 1 for Percent Realized Spreads, all dummy variables are 
statistically significant, and all models have statistically significant F-statistics (at the 
=.01 level of significance).   
Model 2 in Tables 1-4 through 1-8 shows the relationship between the vector of 
control variables and the five market quality characteristics.  The model specified is: 
 
  MktValSHROUTSEMMCNTPRCMQ ***** 543210  
 
As with Model 1, Percent Realized Spreads fails to show any relationship to the 
independent variables.  None of the control variables are significantly different than zero, 
and the model has an insignificant F-statistic.  However, all four other market quality 
characteristics show a strong relationship to most of the control variables (with at least 
three 3, and as many as 4, control variables being statistically significant in each model).  
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All four have statistically significant F-statistics (at the =.01 level of significance), and 
the models explain from 23.23% to 31.15% of the variance in the dependent variable.   
Model 3 in Tables 1-4 through 1-8 test for market quality differences across tiers 
while controlling for the vector of control variables.  The model specified is: 
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This model controls for any market quality differences due to the common listing 
characteristics used in all three tiers, and thereby artificially subdividing the NASDAQ 
listing environment.  Again, with the exception of Model 3 for Percent Realized Spreads, 
the regressions show a relationship between the control variables and the market quality 
characteristics, as well as between the variables of interest and the market quality 
characteristics.  All four regressions are statistically significant F-statistics (at the =.01 
level of significance), and all improve upon the unexplained variance in the market 
quality characteristics, by as much as 15.3%.   
The results of these regressions are consistent with the hypothesis that 
NASDAQ’s tiered structure shows unique market quality differences across tiers.  The 
model controls for the common characteristics of the listing requirements, yet 4 of the 5 
market quality characteristics still show significant differences across tiers.  As you move 
from the bottom of the NASDAQ market, effective spreads tighten, price improvement 
declines, and trading becomes more fragmented across markets.  While these results 
remain consistent with a “scale effect,” the results do not disprove the “unique markets 
hypothesis.”   
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The event study analysis provides a more robust test by looking for immediate, 
short-term changes in market quality when firms change tiers into new listing 
enviroments.  Tables 1-9 through 1-10 show the daily market quality characteristics for 
the 41-day window surrounding the listing switch.  Table 1-9 shows equally weighted 
and value weighted daily averages for firms that rose to a higher tier, while 1-10 shows 
equally weighted and value weighted daily averages for firms that dropped to a lower 
tier.  A quick scan of the measures does not reveal any obvious pattern of change in 
market quality characteristics, and this lack of a change appears robust using equally and 
value weighted measures, as well as for firms that moved up onto a new tier, or dropped.   
Figures 1-2 through 1-11 graphically display these same results on the average 
daily market quality measures.  Note that no short-term, immediate shift appears to occur 
for any of the five market quality measures.  While the cross-section analysis supports the 
idea that true market quality differences exist between the tiers, the initial event study 
analysis does not support the “unique markets hypothesis.”  In fact, only Figures 1-2 and 
1-3 tend to illustrate any sort of trend, with effective spreads appearing to increase in the 
20 days after firms dropped to a lower tier.   
Table 1-11 shows the results of T-tests comparing market quality measures post-
switch versus pre-switch.  Percent Effective Spreads appear to increase when stocks both 
rise and drop onto new tiers.  This finding is robust for equal and value weighted for 
stocks that drop, but not for firms that rise.  All other market quality measures fail to 
show any significant, robust pattern of changes in market quality in the immediate days 
surrounding a listing switch. 
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Thus far, the evidence is mixed.  Cross-section analysis appears consistent with 
the idea that true market quality differences may exist.  Event study analysis appears to 
rule out short-term changes in market quality, with the possible exception of effective 
spreads.  While effective spreads appear to change in the immediate time frame after 
changing tiers, the direction of change is not consistent with the cross-section findings for 
firms moving onto a higher tier.  Regardless, the lack of a clear short-term change 
consistent with the cross-section findings does not necessarily rule out the possibility of a 
long-term change.  The final hypothesis needing testing refers back to Merton’s investor 
attention hypothesis.   
If true market quality differences exist, the differences could stem from at least 
two possible sources.  First, the market quality effect from exposing firms to the 
application of new listing standards, and revealing more precise information to the 
marketplace for accurate pricing of their stocks, could result over the long-term (which is 
not tested here).  Second, market quality changes could stem from increased investor 
attention (i.e. a visibility effect) as stocks become more well-known as they rise to higher 
levels in the NASDAQ marketplace.  
To test this hypothesis, I include two proxies for investor attention, analyst 
coverage and institutional investing, into the cross-section models.  For robustness, I test 
using two approaches.  The first approach uses an OLS regression where the two 
visibility proxies are included into Model 3 and estimated simultaneously with the control 
variables and the variables of interest for the upper and lower tiers, resulting in the 
following specified model:  
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For robustness, I also use a two-stage regression approach where the control variables 
from Model 2 of the cross-section analysis are first used to estimate the expected value of 
the market quality measure, and then a second stage is used to test for a visibility effect 
and market quality differences across the tiers.  The second approach results in the 
following models being applied for each market quality measure: 
Stage One: 
    MktValSHROUTSEMMCNTPRCMQE ***** 543210  
Stage Two: 
    GSMNCMAnalystsINSTMQEMQ ***** 213210  
  
 The results are shown in Tables 1-12 and 1-13.  Table 1-12 shows that all five 
models for the market quality measures have significant F-statistics (four at the =.01 
level of significance, and one at the =.05 level).  These results are consistent with the 
findings from the cross-section portion, now including the model for Realized Spreads 
(though it does explain very little variance in Realized Spreads).  All models improve 
upon the unexplained variance in the dependent variables, by as much as 14% of the 
unexplained variance from the multivariate model that didn’t include the visibility 
proxies.  Institutional interest shows as statistically significant (at the =.01 level of 
significance) for all five market quality measures.  Analyst coverage shows significance 
at the =.01 level of significance for Effective Spreads, but is approaching statistical 
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significance (at the =.1 level of significance) for two of the other four market quality 
measures.   
These results reiterate the earlier findings that market quality faces a tradeoff as 
you move from the lower tiers, where firms are smaller and less visible to investors, to 
the higher tiers.  Effective Spreads decrease, while price improvement declines and 
trading becomes more fragmented across market centers.  The findings are robust in the 
two-stage methodology.  Model 7b shows the results of the two-stage approach.  Again, 
all of the market quality measures show statistically significant F-statistics (at the =.01 
level of significance), and explain similar amounts of variance in the market quality 
measures.  Institutional interest is significant at the =.01 level of significance for all five 
market quality measures, and analyst coverage is significant for the market concentration 
measure (HHI), and is approaching significance for Effective Spreads. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This study looks at a possible explanation for NASDAQ’s 2006 reorganization 
from a two-tiered marketplace into three tiers.  Using the Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(2006) framework, I propose a “unique markets hypothesis” where NASDAQ’s 
motivation was to create a unique marketplace for assets to trade, where listing standards 
are used to create a more transparent trading environment, thereby resulting in market 
quality differences across tiers.  The results indicate that real market quality differences 
do appear to result from the listing structure.  However, the differences appear to result 
more from a visibility effect rather than simply from the listing standards being applied.   
 A short-term analysis of immediate changes in market quality fails to detect any 
material changes in the 20 trading days immediately after a firm switches tiers (with the 
exception of a slight increase in effective spreads).  The evidence is consistent with the 
notion that as firms become better known by investors, additional institutional trading 
and analyst coverage make trading in those assets more transparent, thereby resulting in 
market quality differences between the NASDAQ tiers.  An alternate scenario not ruled 
out by the evidence in this study is that listing standards may result in market quality 
differences over longer time frames, but not in the short-term.  Just as likely, before 
stocks change to a new tier, they may already exhibit market quality characteristics for 
the tier to which they’ll move.  Future studies may be able to further clarify the nature of 
this relationship.   
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Lastly, any market quality effect may be due to the effect of disclosure standards 
being enforced, with the listing standards simply being the tool through which the 
disclosures reveal information to the marketplace.  This idea lends itself nicely to studies 
on stocks where NASDAQ discloses firms that fail to meet listing standards for a specific 
tier, and then testing whether or not those disclosures result in changes to the trading 
environment for those stocks (or even an asset pricing effect).  In these cases, the listings 
standards are being held constant and the disclosure impact could be isolated.  This 
approach also avoids the joint hypothesis problems from earlier studies on the disclosure-
liquidity relationship, since these stocks would all face the same listing requirements, the 
same regulatory environment, and the same market microstructure. 
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Table 1-1: Changes in NASDAQ Tier Listings, 2006-2008 
 
Tier Jul-06 Dec-08 Change
Global Select Market 1,140 1,222 82
Global Market 1,353 1,116 (237)
Capital Market 529 497 (32)
Total 3,022 2,835 (187)  
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Table 1-2: NASDAQ Listing and Market Quality Statistics. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Firm 
Characteristics
Variable Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
Bid Price $2.14 $27.90 $410.61 $0.32 $11.91 $114.79 $0.44 $9.25 $111.43
# Mkt Makers 14.50 39.92 97.50 11.00 28.21 73.50 11.00 20.31 53.50
Stockholder's Equity (in $Ms) ($1,065.15) $817.52 $40,314.50 ($5,790.50) $86.11 $1,497.08 ($244.49) $29.92 $825.60
# Publicly Available Shares (in Ms) 3.15 107.08 9,941.00 1.12 26.20 486.72 1.20 15.83 241.19
Market Value of Public Shares (in $Ms) $85.69 $2,679.27 $251,755.83 $3.37 $229.18 $7,992.03 $1.87 $95.69 $6,279.41
Dependent Variable  NCM GSM F adj-r2
Bid Price $11.94 -$2.94 $15.83 422.94 22.01%
0.0006*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
# Mkt Makers 28.28 -8.23 11.79 518.25 25.70%
<.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
Stockholder's Equity (in $Ms) $86.08 -$56.26 $731.43 65.22 4.59%
0.0715* 0.5412 <.0001*** <.0001***
# Publicly Available Shares (in Ms) $26.43 -$11.27 $77.90 29.35 1.86%
0.0006*** 0.4406 <.0001*** <.0001***
Market Value of Public Shares (in $Ms) $231.92 -$144.25 $2,387.26 45.33 2.88%
0.2106 0.6807 <.0001*** <.0001***
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Market 
Quality Characteristics
Variable Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
% Effective Spread 0.009% 0.106% 1.281% 0.023% 0.469% 3.068% 0.016% 1.140% 9.050%
% Realized Spread -0.104% 0.030% 0.941% -5.526% 0.151% 26.912% -104.562% -0.139% 4.911%
Price Improvement Amount 0.010% 0.080% 0.679% 0.026% 0.250% 2.313% 0.013% 0.527% 3.706%
Price Improvement Rate 0.852% 5.866% 16.594% 0.456% 5.440% 23.805% 0.902% 6.411% 24.049%
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 0.5002 0.5831 0.8955 0.5000 0.6675 1.0000 0.5042 0.7739 0.9903
GSM (n=1,039)
GSM (n=1,039)
Panel B: Regressions for differences between tiers.
The NASDAQ Global Market is the base case.  NCM  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ Capital Market, and 0 otherwise.  GSM  is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the stock is listed on the Global Select Market, and 0 otherwise.  
NGM (n=1,192) NCM (n=436)
NGM (n=1,192) NCM (n=436)
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level of significance.
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Table 1-3: Correlations. 
 
PRC MMCNT SE SHROUT MktVal NCM GSM %EffSprd %RealSprd PI Amt PI Rate HHI INST
PRC 1
MMCNT 0.17414*** 1
<.0001
SE 0.22329*** 0.37709*** 1
<.0001 <.0001
SHROUT 0.03214* 0.36221*** 0.78685*** 1
0.097 <.0001 <.0001
MktVal 0.23333*** 0.34874*** 0.85685*** 0.90585*** 1
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
NCM -0.21218*** -0.33837*** -0.08686*** -0.05908*** -0.06517*** 1
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0023 0.0008
GSM 0.46252*** 0.46201*** 0.21546*** 0.13569*** 0.1676*** -0.35316*** 1
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
%EffSprd -0.27266*** -0.48971*** -0.12172*** -0.08823*** -0.09657*** 0.49458*** -0.42119*** 1
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
%RealSprd -0.00176*** -0.01213 -0.00324 -0.00208 -0.00274 -0.03491* -0.00856 0.05364*** 1
0.9274 0.5313 0.8671 0.9146 0.8876 0.0715 0.6586 0.0056
PI Amt -0.363*** -0.39249*** -0.11891*** -0.07701*** -0.09529*** 0.44654*** -0.4028*** 0.74602*** 0.02359 1
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2233
PI Rate 0.3517*** -0.26369*** -0.06113*** -0.11875*** -0.03514* 0.10812*** 0.03069 0.10379*** 0.02049 -0.03621* 1
<.0001 <.0001 0.0016 <.0001 0.0696 <.0001 0.113 <.0001 0.2901 0.0615
HHI -0.34956*** -0.47479*** -0.14226*** -0.06427*** -0.1055*** 0.47868*** -0.48926*** 0.56043*** 0.00107 0.48385*** 0.13247*** 1
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0009 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9558 <.0001 <.0001
INST -0.43121*** 0.02208 0.03061 0.16432*** 0.06096*** 0.25027*** -0.33811*** 0.27313*** 0.02164 0.34391*** -0.32396*** 0.42113*** 1
<.0001 0.2607 0.1188 <.0001 0.0019 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2702 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Analysts 0.22903*** 0.71269*** 0.40849*** 0.31819*** 0.38034*** -0.16062*** 0.34291*** -0.34617*** -0.03176 0.30651*** -0.12227*** -0.33908*** -0.05258**
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1865 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0221
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level of significance.  
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Table 1-4: OLS Estimations, Effective Spread. 
 
Independent Variables
1 2 3
 4.640E-01 1.239E+00 9.341E-01
<.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
PRC -8.540E-03 -4.480E-03
<.0001*** <.0001***
MMCNT -2.108E-02 -1.462E-02
<.0001*** <.0001***
SE 8.700E-06 1.271E-05
0.4666 0.2509
SHROUT -2.476E-07 -1.127E-07
0.0066*** 0.1836
Mktval 1.889E-08 9.587E-09
<.0001*** 0.0193**
NCM 7.104E-01 5.448E-01
<.0001*** <.0001***
GSM -3.555E-01 -1.437E-01
<.0001*** <.0001***
n 2667 2667 2667
F 609.81 219.22 249.1
p-value <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
Adj-r2 0.3135 0.2917 0.3945
Dependent variable: Percent Effective Spread  is the realized spread, measured as a 
percent of the stock price.
Independent variables:  PRC  is the stock price.  MMCNT  is the number of registered 
market makers.  SE  is the Stockholders' Equity.  SHROUT  is the number of publicly 
held shares of stock (i.e. Public Float).  Mktval  is the market value of publicly held 
shares.  NCM  is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ 
Capital Market, and 0 otherwise.  GSM  is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is 
listed on the Global Select Market, and 0 otherwise.  The NASDAQ Global Market 
serves as the base case.
Model
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level of significance.
P-values reported below regression coefficients.  
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Table 1-5: OLS Estimations, Percent Realized Spread. 
 
Independent Variables
1 2 3
 0.12642 1.227E-01 2.635E-01
.0828* 0.323 .0668*
PRC 2.041E-04 -1.552E-04
0.9484 0.965
MMCNT -2.240E-03 -3.960E-03
0.535 0.3303
SE 1.726E-07 2.720E-06
0.9975 0.9612
SHROUT 5.845E-08 4.679E-08
0.8906 0.913
Mktval -1.708E-09 -5.720E-10
0.9334 0.978
NCM -2.895E-01 -3.207E-01
0.0363* 0.0244**
GSM -1.209E-01 -7.643E-02
0.2489 0.5465
n 2667 2667 2667
F 2.29 0.08 0.79
p-value 0.1014 0.9948 0.5952
Adj-r2 0.001 -0.0017 -0.0006
Dependent variable: Percent Realized Spread  is the realized spread, measured as a 
percent of the stock price.
Independent variables:  PRC  is the stock price.  MMCNT  is the number of registered 
market makers.  SE  is the Stockholders' Equity.  SHROUT  is the number of publicly held 
shares of stock (i.e. Public Float).  Mktval  is the market value of publicly held shares.  
NCM is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ Capital 
Market, and 0 otherwise.  GSM is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on 
the Global Select Market, and 0 otherwise.  The NASDAQ Global Market serves as the 
base case.
Model
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level of significance.
P-values reported below regression coefficients.  
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Table 1-6: OLS Estimations, Price Improvement Amount. 
 
Independent Variables
1 2 3
 2.500E-03 5.640E-03 4.370E-03
<.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
PRC -0.0000616 -0.00004547
<.0001*** <.0001***
MMCNT -7.259E-05 -4.646E-05
<.0001*** <.0001***
SE 1.192E-08 2.651E-08
0.8353 0.6251
SHROUT -2.190E-09 -1.655E-09
<.0001*** <.0001***
Mktval 1.273E-10 9.026E-11
<.0001*** <.0001***
NCM 2.780E-03 2.280E-03
<.0001*** <.0001***
GSM -1.700E-03 -5.301E-04
<.0001*** <.0001***
n 2667 2667 2667
F 485.75 187.97 197.26
p-value <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
Adj-r2 0.2675 0.2596 0.3401
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level of significance.
P-values reported below regression coefficients.
Dependent variable: Price Improvement Amount  is the dollar amount of price 
improvement for trades executed within the quoted spread, measured as a percent of the 
stock price.
Independent variables:  PRC  is the stock price.  MMCNT  is the number of registered 
market makers.  SE  is the Stockholders' Equity.  SHROUT is the number of publicly held 
shares of stock (i.e. Public Float).  Mktval  is the market value of publicly held shares.  
NCM is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ Capital 
Market, and 0 otherwise.  GSM  is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on 
the Global Select Market, and 0 otherwise.  The NASDAQ Global Market serves as the 
base case.
Model
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Table 1-7: OLS Estimations, Price Improvement Rate. 
 
Independent Variables
1 2 3
 5.440E-02 6.532E-02 6.194E-02
<.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
PRC 6.272E-04 6.474E-04
<.0001*** <.0001***
MMCNT -5.908E-04 -5.402E-04
<.0001*** <.0001***
SE -9.103E-07 -9.377E-07
0.0817* 0.0722*
SHROUT 1.825E-09 2.490E-09
0.6467 0.5329
Mktval 4.447E-11 -6.757E-12
0.8162 0.9721
NCM 9.720E-03 7.140E-03
<.0001*** <.0001***
GSM 4.270E-03 7.389E-04
<.0001*** 0.5318
n 2667 2667 2667
F 23.19 162.32 121.27
p-value <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
Adj-r2 0.0164 0.2323 0.2400
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level of significance.
P-values reported below regression coefficients.
Dependent variable: Price Improvement Rate  is the percent of shares executed within the 
quoted spread, measured as a percent of total volume.
Independent variables:  PRC  is the stock price.  MMCNT  is the number of registered 
market makers.  SE  is the Stockholders' Equity.  SHROUT  is the number of publicly held 
shares of stock (i.e. Public Float).  Mktval  is the market value of publicly held shares.  
NCM is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ Capital 
Market, and 0 otherwise.  GSM  is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the 
Global Select Market, and 0 otherwise.  The NASDAQ Global Market serves as the base 
case.
Model
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Table 1-8: OLS Estimations, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
 
Independent Variables
1 2 3
 0.66754 7.964E-01 7.425E-01
<.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
PRC -1.900E-03 -9.789E-04
<.0001*** <.0001***
MMCNT -3.580E-03 -2.270E-03
<.0001*** <.0001***
SE -2.150E-06 -8.398E-07
0.3087 0.6659
SHROUT -3.875E-10 3.023E-08
0.9807 0.0424**
Mktval 2.402E-09 3.369E-10
0.0019*** 0.6399
NCM 1.064E-01 8.612E-02
<.0001*** <.0001***
GSM 8.443E-02 -4.482E-02
<.0001*** <.0001***
n 2667 2667 2667
F 705.56 242.25 273.1
p-value <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
Adj-r2 0.3458 0.3115 0.4167
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level of significance.
P-values reported below regression coefficients.
Dependent variable: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  is the measure representing order flow 
fragmentation across major market centers, and ranges from 0 to 1.
Independent variables:  PRC  is the stock price.  MMCNT  is the number of registered 
market makers.  SE  is the Stockholders' Equity.  SHROUT  is the number of publicly held 
shares of stock (i.e. Public Float).  Mktval  is the market value of publicly held shares.  
NCM is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ Capital 
Market, and 0 otherwise.  GSM  is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the 
Global Select Market, and 0 otherwise.  The NASDAQ Global Market serves as the base 
case.
Model
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Table 1-9: Market Quality as Firms Rise to Higher Tier. 
 
Trading 
Day EffSpread RealSpread PI Amt PI Rate HHI
-20 1.01% 1.17% 0.41% 35.01% 49.69%
-10 0.81% 0.97% 0.27% 25.31% 46.82%
-9 1.00% 1.12% 0.30% 32.37% 48.42%
-8 0.84% 1.01% 0.24% 32.77% 47.46%
-7 0.86% 1.01% 0.27% 31.57% 44.72%
-6 0.80% 0.98% 0.28% 30.54% 50.71%
-5 0.90% 1.10% 0.50% 31.83% 45.84%
-4 1.14% 1.72% 0.30% 30.37% 46.76%
-3 0.95% 0.99% 0.22% 34.90% 48.18%
-2 0.69% 0.80% 0.22% 32.49% 43.70%
-1 0.96% 1.14% 0.26% 31.72% 46.26%
0 0.81% 0.99% 0.27% 33.42% 46.08%
1 0.87% 1.03% 0.28% 33.63% 46.33%
2 1.08% 1.28% 0.27% 30.28% 46.70%
3 0.90% 0.91% 0.25% 32.14% 47.25%
4 1.20% 1.05% 0.33% 28.52% 46.10%
5 1.05% 0.81% 0.35% 33.10% 45.92%
6 0.99% 1.09% 0.41% 34.15% 47.26%
7 1.10% 0.95% 0.25% 33.24% 48.40%
8 0.85% 1.02% 0.24% 30.65% 46.75%
9 1.04% 0.81% 0.26% 30.85% 47.68%
10 0.92% 1.07% 0.23% 31.35% 47.34%
20 1.03% 1.00% 0.23% 29.74% 45.67%
Trading 
Day EffSpread RealSpread PI Amt PI Rate HHI
-20 0.36% 0.75% 0.12% 20.35% 44.93%
-10 0.47% 0.78% 0.11% 20.58% 46.00%
-9 0.40% 0.73% 0.14% 25.19% 42.79%
-8 0.36% 0.65% 0.11% 23.80% 40.03%
-7 0.49% 0.66% 0.12% 21.47% 40.71%
-6 0.42% 0.66% 0.12% 22.34% 42.58%
-5 0.40% 0.70% 0.12% 20.40% 41.45%
-4 0.35% 0.99% 0.10% 20.13% 40.96%
-3 0.61% 0.75% 0.11% 19.96% 41.70%
-2 0.37% 0.68% 0.12% 23.83% 40.31%
-1 0.38% 0.68% 0.12% 20.32% 41.78%
0 0.42% 0.95% 0.13% 22.02% 44.01%
1 0.46% 0.68% 0.12% 22.83% 40.74%
2 0.45% 0.80% 0.13% 21.42% 42.87%
3 0.37% 0.66% 0.11% 20.84% 44.03%
4 0.46% 0.88% 0.14% 23.14% 41.30%
5 0.41% 0.63% 0.14% 23.94% 41.35%
6 0.48% 0.82% 0.13% 20.40% 40.21%
7 0.48% 0.66% 0.13% 21.80% 52.66%
8 0.35% 0.66% 0.12% 23.15% 40.61%
9 0.41% 0.57% 0.14% 24.13% 42.11%
10 0.44% 0.64% 0.11% 24.85% 42.18%
20 0.53% 1.15% 0.16% 18.68% 38.74%
Equally Weighted
Value Weighted
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Table 1-10: Market Quality as Firms Drop to Lower Tier. 
 
Trading 
Day EffSpread RealSpread PI Amt PI Rate HHI
-20 3.55% 3.81% 1.16% 33.04% 48.97%
-10 3.99% 4.34% 1.03% 34.00% 51.06%
-9 4.33% 4.37% 1.28% 32.15% 52.88%
-8 4.08% 4.16% 2.74% 30.40% 52.60%
-7 4.27% 3.82% 1.34% 26.02% 53.18%
-6 4.15% 4.06% 1.37% 31.62% 51.12%
-5 4.00% 4.19% 1.12% 27.75% 50.06%
-4 5.02% 4.34% 1.43% 31.57% 52.14%
-3 4.69% 4.23% 1.38% 35.23% 53.56%
-2 4.14% 3.81% 1.14% 29.95% 50.35%
-1 4.17% 4.30% 1.31% 25.97% 50.72%
0 5.02% 4.64% 1.34% 32.40% 52.71%
1 4.51% 4.14% 1.62% 34.04% 51.16%
2 4.01% 3.88% 1.01% 30.99% 53.60%
3 4.33% 3.86% 1.26% 28.55% 50.22%
4 4.57% 3.66% 1.18% 38.66% 53.80%
5 4.56% 4.36% 1.84% 32.90% 53.08%
6 3.89% 3.68% 1.34% 32.58% 49.20%
7 5.73% 5.74% 1.41% 31.51% 49.13%
8 4.28% 4.41% 2.12% 36.30% 52.12%
9 4.51% 3.88% 1.20% 33.77% 51.80%
10 4.70% 4.72% 1.62% 32.73% 52.65%
20 4.81% 4.40% 1.47% 36.95% 54.39%
Trading 
Day EffSpread RealSpread PI Amt PI Rate HHI
-20 1.99% 2.31% 0.50% 22.44% 42.27%
-10 2.55% 2.90% 0.68% 26.23% 46.12%
-9 2.32% 2.62% 0.53% 25.04% 47.14%
-8 2.26% 2.43% 0.72% 25.53% 45.69%
-7 2.17% 2.51% 0.63% 19.76% 43.29%
-6 2.09% 2.45% 0.62% 19.23% 43.34%
-5 2.09% 2.75% 0.56% 16.56% 44.46%
-4 2.38% 2.82% 0.67% 26.42% 52.04%
-3 2.59% 2.66% 0.78% 24.24% 49.68%
-2 2.17% 2.63% 0.91% 13.98% 55.61%
-1 3.80% 2.81% 1.11% 22.01% 45.45%
0 3.50% 3.50% 1.06% 25.82% 45.50%
1 2.82% 2.98% 0.85% 24.74% 45.67%
2 3.20% 2.80% 0.87% 23.54% 48.84%
3 3.33% 3.22% 0.77% 22.43% 46.29%
4 2.20% 2.84% 0.66% 31.94% 52.36%
5 3.08% 2.99% 0.80% 23.36% 46.56%
6 2.35% 3.48% 0.70% 24.07% 45.33%
7 2.27% 3.62% 0.57% 18.39% 43.71%
8 2.82% 2.92% 0.79% 20.42% 44.35%
9 2.54% 2.79% 0.77% 23.45% 45.89%
10 2.43% 3.21% 0.67% 22.78% 43.97%
20 2.46% 1.90% 0.39% 27.25% 42.30%
Equally Weighted
Value Weighted
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Table 1-11: T-tests for Market Quality Differences. 
 
EW VW EW VW
Post 4.57% 3.05% 0.96% 0.49%
Pre 4.22% 2.57% 0.96% 0.41%
Diff (Post-Pre) 0.35% 0.48% 0.00% 0.08%
p-value 0.0187** 0.0625* 0.9819 0.0377**
Post 4.34% 3.37% 1.00% 0.73%
Pre 4.10% 2.88% 1.08% 0.71%
Diff (Post-Pre) 0.24% 0.49% -0.08% 0.02%
p-value 0.1356 0.0522* 0.1560 0.6045
Post 32.86% 23.21% 31.44% 22.02%
Pre 32.06% 22.87% 31.63% 21.11%
Diff (Post-Pre) 0.80% 0.34% -0.20% 0.91%
p-value 0.3723 0.7609 0.7926 0.1518
Post 1.42% 0.72% 0.28% 0.13%
Pre 1.35% 0.75% 0.29% 0.12%
Diff (Post-Pre) 0.08% -0.03% -0.01% 0.01%
p-value 0.4306 0.5513 0.5746 0.0027**
Post 51.80% 45.12% 46.72% 42.99%
Pre 51.93% 46.62% 46.84% 42.15%
Diff (Post-Pre) -0.13% -1.50% -0.13% 0.84%
p-value 0.8143 0.1212 0.7622 0.3787
Rising to
Higher Tier
n=74 n=84
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level of significance.
Pre-Post Market Quality Differences
HHI
PI Amt
PI Rate
RealSpread
EffSpread
Dropping to
Lower Tier 
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Table 1-12: OLS Estimations for Visibility Effect. 
 
Independent Variables Eff Spread Real Spread PI Amt PI Rate HHI
 5.117E-01 9.575E-02 2.630E-03 6.613E-02 6.587E-01
<.0001*** 0.1037 <.0001*** <.0001*** 0.0018***
PRC -2.470E-03 -6.201E-04 -2.085E-05 5.320E-04 -3.986E-04
<.0001*** 0.625 <.0001*** <.0001*** 0.0018***
MMCNT -9.910E-03 -3.230E-03 -3.828E-05 -4.559E-04 -1.970E-03
<.0001*** 0.0644* <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
SE 4.420E-06 9.977E-07 1.111E-08 -9.530E-07 -7.081E-07
0.3851 0.9489 0.6985 0.0406** 0.6505
SHROUT -1.698E-07 -1.060E-07 -1.527E-09 4.508E-09 -1.573E-08
0.0001*** 0.431 <.0001*** 0.2625 0.2445
Mktval 7.217E-09 3.652E-09 5.891E-11 2.959E-11 1.117E-09
0.0003*** 0.5438 <.0001*** 0.8693 0.0646*
INST 1.162E+00 8.950E-01 7.970E-03 -5.319E-02 5.185E-01
<.0001*** 0.0013*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
Analysts 3.460E-03 1.140E-03 1.014E-05 -1.103E-04 -4.502E-04
0.0019*** 0.7379 0.1052 0.2769 0.1865
NCM 2.884E-01 -1.508E-01 1.070E-03 9.830E-03 6.108E-02
<.0001*** 0.0321** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
GSM -4.826E-02 1.707E-02 -2.784E-04 2.454E-04 -1.326E-02
0.0002*** 0.6708 0.0002*** 0.8381 0.001***
n 2667 2667 2667 2667 2667
F 162.34 1.98 145.23 81.86 146.15
p-value <.0001*** 0.0379** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
Adj-r2 0.4578 0.0051 0.4301 0.2973 0.4317
Independent variables:  PRC  is the stock price.  MMCNT  is the number of registered market makers.  SE 
is the Stockholders' Equity.  SHROUT  is the number of publicly held shares of stock (i.e. Public Float).  
Mktval  is the market value of publicly held shares.  INST  is the percent of total volume from 
institutional investors.  Analysts  is the number of analysts providing earnings estimates for the stock.  
NCM  is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ Capital Market, and 0 
otherwise.  GSM  is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the Global Select Market, and 0 
otherwise.  The NASDAQ Global Market serves as the base case.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level of significance.
P-values reported below regression coefficients.  
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Table 1-13: Two-Stage OLS Estimations for Visibility Effect. 
 
Independent Variables
 9.322E-01 5.150E-01 2.510E-01 0.07579 4.420E-03 2.570E-03 6.348E-02 6.680E-02 7.425E-01 6.552E-01
<.0001*** <.0001*** .0471** 0.1423 <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
E(RealSpread) 6.641E-01 4.139E-01 1.682E+00 1.176E+00 6.858E-01 4.036E-01 9.856E-01 8.184E-01 6.084E-01 4.030E-01
<.0001*** <.0001*** 0.3359 0.1189 <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
INST 1.450E-03 8.129E-01 6.610E-03 -5.081E-02 4.420E-01
<.0001*** 0.0012*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
Analysts 9.366E-01 1.259E-04 -3.800E-06 -5.168E-05 -1.060E-03
0.1448 0.9679 0.473 0.4887 0.0005***
NCM 5.461E-01 3.013E-01 -3.178E-01 -1.440E-01 2.270E-03 1.160E-03 6.730E-03 9.650E-03 8.619E-02 6.618E-02
<.0001*** <.0001*** 0.0246** 0.0397** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
GSM -1.299E-01 -4.597E-02 -8.338E-02 6.694E-04 -5.345E-04 -3.011E-04 1.600E-03 6.531E-04 -4.303E-02 -1.222E-02
<.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.456 0.9854 <.0001*** 0.1415 0.1031 0.5539 <.0001*** 0.0018***
n 2667 2667 2667 2667 2667 2667 2667 2667 2667 2667
F 579.76 280.5 1.84 3.17 459.96 248.58 282.54 147.06 635.21 253.42
p-value <.0001*** <.0001*** 0.1384 0.0075*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001*** <.0001***
Adj-r2 0.3944 0.4483 0.0009 0.0063 0.3406 0.4185 0.2414 0.2981 0.4165 0.4231
Independent variables:  E(EffSpread)  is the expected effective spread, calculated using the coefficients from the vector of control variables, as the first stage in a two-stage 
estimation.  INST  is the percent of total volume from institutional investors.  Analysts  is the number of analysts providing earnings estimates for the stock.  NCM  is a dummy 
variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ Capital Market, and 0 otherwise.  GSM  is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock is listed on the Global Select 
Market, and 0 otherwise.  The NASDAQ Global Market serves as the base case.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level of significance.
P-values reported below regression coefficients.
Dependent Variables
HHIPI RatePI AmtReal SpreadEff Spread
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Figure 1-1: Optimal Listing Standards. 
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Figure 1-2: Percent Effective Spread (Equally Weighted). 
 
 
 
Figure 1-3: Percent Effective Spread (Value Weighted). 
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Figure 1-4: Percent Realized Spread (Equally Weighted). 
 
 
 
Figure 1-5: Percent Realized Spread (Value Weighted). 
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Figure 1-6: Percent Price Improvement Amount (Equally Weighted). 
 
 
 
Figure 1-7:  Percent Price Improvement Amount (Value Weighted). 
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Figure 1-8:  Price Improvement Rate (Equally Weighted). 
 
 
 
Figure 1-9:  Price Improvement Rate (Value Weighted). 
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Figure 1-10: Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (Equally Weighted). 
 
 
 
Figure 1-11: Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (Value Weighted). 
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ESSAY TWO 
 
 
 
DO TIERED STRUCTURES FACILITATE A REPUTATION EFFECT?  EVIDENCE 
FROM NASDAQ. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Essay One put forth the notion that NASDAQ’s tiered structure may have been 
motivated by NASDAQ’s desire to create unique trading environments, where the tiers 
use listing requirements (initial or continued) to aid investors in the production of 
information useful in pricing assets traded in their marketplace.  Essay Two presents an 
alternative motivation.  Rather than using a tiered structure to create unique trading 
environments, NASDAQ may use a tiered structure as a tool to enhance their reputation 
in order to better compete for listings.  This study seeks to determine if NASDAQ’s 2006 
restructuring resulted in any material changes in NASDAQ’s reputation and their 
competitiveness in the marketplace for listings.   
Merton’s (1987) investor attention hypothesis states that when a firm increases its 
investor base (i.e. visibility), it can lower their expected returns, reduce their cost of 
capital, and increase their market value.  Thus, increased visibility can serve as a proxy 
for higher reputation.  The NASDAQ restructuring provides an interesting opportunity to 
examine the impact of this restructuring on firm reputation via event study. 
The first part of the essay uses an asset pricing approach to identify a potential 
reputation effect.  In other words, did investors interpret the restructuring as positively 
impacting NASDAQ’s ability to attract firms or investors, thereby creating the 
expectation of higher potential earnings through greater listing fees and trading 
commissions?     
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While a positive impact to NASDAQ’s stock price would clearly represent a 
direct reputation effect, the possibility also exists for an indirect reputation effect.  If the 
restructuring signaled lower risk and greater prestige for firms listing on the new GSM 
tier, the new tier would assist in increasing their investor bases (i.e. visibility), reducing 
their cost of capital, and increasing their market value.  Any collective impact on GSM 
stocks would represent an indirect reputation effect for NASDAQ.  The initial analysis 
focuses on any indirect impact to the stocks affected by the restructuring, the former 
NASDAQ National Market stocks that were re-categorized as the Global Select and 
Global Market stocks.   
The second part of essay two specifically focuses on any changes in NASDAQ’s 
ability to compete for new listings in the IPO market.  A direct change in NASDAQ’s 
competitiveness could also represent a reputation effect resulting from the restructuring.  
If a higher proportion of new firms that are eligible for listing on multiple exchanges 
chose to list on NASDAQ after the restructuring, this increase provides support for a 
reputation effect.    
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
 
 
 
Under the Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) framework, exchanges face a trade-
off between the value resulting from a higher reputation and the value of expected cash 
flows from firms listing on the exchange.  The optimal listing standards maximize the 
combination of these two offsetting values.  Consider an alternative motivation under this 
theoretical approach.  The ability to create a tiered structure might allow a market to alter 
this tradeoff between the reputation value and the value of expected cash flows.   
Consider a single-tiered market with only one listing criterion, market 
capitalization, and the exchange lists only firms with a minimum market capitalization of 
$100M.  If the exchange decides to create a new lower tier, with a minimum market 
capitalization of $25M for the new lower tier (ceteris paribus), the exchange doesn’t 
appear to create materially different tiers.  If the trading structure is the exact same, the 
exchange is simply allowing a new set of “lower reputation” firms to list in a trading 
environment with the same market frictions (again, assuming the same trading 
technology, the same trading rules, etc.).  The exchange can then signal that the new 
lower tier is a specialized tier for smaller, emerging companies, while continuing to 
promote the higher listing standards of the original tier.  Figure 2-1 shows this 
relationship.   
Under the optimal standards for an exchange having only one tier, Point S denotes 
the point where the total value of listing fees plus reputation value is maximized.  If the 
exchange were to lower listing standards, their cash flows from listing fees would 
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increase (from Point A to Point B) as they attracted new firms to list on their exchange 
(that were ineligible for listing under the old listing standards), but their reputation value 
would be reduced (from Point A to Point C) as investors view the exchange as becoming 
a “lower reputation” exchange.  The trade-off between reputation value and value from 
listing fees would result in a shift along the Total Value Curve (from Point S to Point T), 
but a minimal change in the total value of the exchange.  On the other hand, a tiered 
structure could have a different effect. 
The creation of a lower tier could allow the exchange to maintain their “high 
reputation” while increasing their cash flows from listing fees.  As long as the exchange 
successfully markets the lower tier as being a specialized market for emerging 
companies, while minimizing similarities with the higher tier, the exchange could allow 
new companies to list on the lower tier.  If successful, their cash flow would increase 
(from Point A to Point B) while the reputation value would remain stable (from Point A 
to Point D).  The end result would be an upward shift in total value from Point S to U.   
In the case of NASDAQ, this effect could help explain the motivation to move 
away from its original single-tiered structure as first developed in 1971.  In the early 
1980s, as the NASDAQ firms began to diverge into distinct classes of larger and smaller 
firms, the NASDAQ divided into the NASDAQ National Market and the NASDAQ 
Small-Cap Market.  NASDAQ’s success with a tiered structure may have motivated 
European exchanges in Belgium, Germany, France, and Holland to adopt similar market 
segments in order to attract high growth companies (Mendoza, 2007).  Today, the 
dominant European exchange using a tiered structure is the London Stock Exchange with 
its Alternative Investment Market.   
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Conversely, now consider the same single-tiered market with only one listing 
criteria, market capitalization, and the exchange lists only firms with a minimum market 
capitalization of $100M.  If the exchange creates a second higher tier, with a minimum 
market capitalization of $250M for the new higher tier (ceteris paribus), the exchange 
doesn’t appear to create materially different tiers.  If the trading structure is still the exact 
same, the exchange is simply reclassifying  an already existing subset of its listed 
companies as being “higher reputation” firms, and this new tier still has the same market 
frictions (again, assuming the same trading technology, the same trading rules, etc.).  The 
exchange can then signal that the new higher tier is a “blue chip” tier for larger, 
established companies, in an attempt to compete with other high reputation exchanges.  
The exchange would promote the higher listing standards (“a blue chip market for blue 
chip companies”) in an effort to enhance their reputation value.   
If successful, the exchange would reap a higher reputation value by promoting the 
virtues of the highest tier, while continuing to collect listing fees from the lowest tier.  
Figure 2-2 shows this relationship.  Under the optimal standards for an exchange having 
only one tier, Point S denotes the point where the total value of listing fees plus 
reputation value is maximized.  If the exchange were to increase their listing standards, 
their reputation value would increase (from Point A to Point B), but their cash flows from 
listing fees would be reduced (from Point A to Point C) as some firms would no longer 
meet the higher listing standards.  The trade-off between reputation value and cash flows 
from listing fees would result in a shift along the Total Value Curve (from Point S to 
Point T), but a minimal change in the total value of the exchange.  On the other hand, a 
tiered structure could have a different effect. 
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The creation of a higher tier could allow the exchange to continue collecting cash 
flows from listed companies that do not exceed the “high reputation” threshold of the 
upper tier.  As a result, the value from listing fees would remain stable (a shift from Point 
A to Point D).  The reputation value would increase (from Point A to Point B) if the 
exchange could successfully promote the merits of the higher tier while minimizing 
awareness of the similarities with the lower tier.  The end result would be an upward shift 
in total value from Point S to Point U.   
In this example, the tiers might not exhibit market quality differences beyond the 
market capitalization and public float of stocks listed on each tier.  The entire market, 
regardless of tier, could be viewed as one big market with all stocks exhibiting the same 
trading frictions, differing only by a scale effect (i.e. the tiers are little more than liquidity 
tiers with the same frictions).  Thus, the exchange could maximize their total value by 
implementing higher standards through the creation of an upper tier.   
Under this scenario, the exchange benefits by establishing a tiered-structure and 
promoting the benefits of a high-reputation, upper tier in order to enhance their reputation 
value while maintaining their cash flows from listing fees.  If so, the only material 
differences in market quality between the tiers, ceteris paribus, should result primarily 
from firm size and public float.  The entire marketplace, regardless of tier, could be 
viewed as one big market with all stocks exhibiting the same trading frictions, but 
differing only in scale (i.e. the tiers are little more than liquidity tiers with similar trading 
frictions).  This “Reputation Hypothesis” may explain NASDAQ’s motivation for a tiered 
market structure.   
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NASDAQ’s current competitive environment, defined by a highly competitive 
marketplace for new listings and an ongoing wave of consolidation in exchanges and 
trading platforms (in an attempt to garner market share), might have created the need to 
create the new Global Select Market.  Having already restructured to gain a competitive 
advantage at the lower end of the market, the GSM restructuring appears aimed at 
gaining a competitive advantage at the upper end of the market.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 While the theoretical motivation simply provides a justification for the reason 
why NASDAQ restructured (i.e. to enhance their reputation value), the empirical portion 
of this essay attempts to measure whether or not the restructuring actually enhanced 
NASDAQ’s reputation.  Two techniques previously used to measure an impact on a 
firm’s reputation include visibility and competitiveness approaches.   
For publicly traded firms, an asset pricing approach measures changes in a firm’s 
“visibility” to serve as a proxy for changes in their reputation.  Since NASDAQ began 
publicly trading on the NASDAQ Stock Market in 2005, any reputation effect can be 
measured directly on NASDAQ’s stock.  If NASDAQ’s restructuring was designed to 
draw new attention to their marketplace, any positive reputation impact should result in a 
positive stock pricing effect.  Additionally, the reputation effect could be indirect, 
specifically to stocks listed on the newest NASDAQ tier.   
While researchers have yet to specifically measure any reputation effect with 
exchanges, ample evidence does exist that reputation (i.e. visibility) is priced in stocks.  
Kadlec and McConnell (1994) find that visibility changes are an important determinant in 
explaining firm decisions to move their listing from NASDAQ to NYSE.  Thus, firms 
seek the reputation effect from moving to the higher-reputation setting (i.e. from 
NASDAQ to NYSE).  Jain and Kim (2006) find that firms experience positive 
cumulative abnormal returns upon switching their listing from NASDAQ to the NYSE.   
Papaioannou et al. (2008) analyze changes in operating performance resulting 
from the increased visibility of firms moving their listing to NYSE.  They find that 
72 
 
increased visibility leads to increased operating performance.  Likewise, Baker, Powell, 
and Weaver (1999) argue that visibility is important to firms.  The increased visibility 
may increase information flow about a firm (reduces uncertainty) and enhance the 
efficiency of trading in their stock (reduces information asymmetries).  However, they 
find that the increased visibility results from changes in market capitalization, and not 
simply from the listing decision.   
Thus, the following hypotheses will be tested: 
H0:  The NASDAQ reorganization had no positive impact on their reputation 
(i.e. no indirect reputation effect). 
 
H1:  The NASDAQ reorganization had a positive impact on their reputation 
through the stocks listed on their exchange (i.e. an indirect reputation 
effect). 
 
   On the other hand, Barber and Odean (2008) propose evidence that any asset 
pricing effect resulting from the restructuring may be only temporary, resulting from the 
increased attention around the timing of the announcement.  They show that investors are 
net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, and that attention-driven buying does not result 
in superior returns.  Consequently, any reputation effect may simply be a temporary 
attention effect due to the restructuring announcement.  Therefore, the asset pricing 
analysis will include determining if any reputation effect is permanent or temporary. 
For exchanges in particular, the competitiveness approach measures changes in 
their ability to compete for listings, and this change in competitiveness also serves as a 
proxy for reputation.  NASDAQ’s enhanced ability to attract new listings (from existing 
or new public firms) could lead investors to expect higher future cash flows.  Easley and 
O’Hara (2006) state that exchanges collect revenues both through listing fees and 
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transaction fees, both of which would increase if a higher proportion of firms choose to 
list on NASDAQ.  Higher cash flows could lead to an expectation of higher earnings, and 
thus to a positive impact to their stock price as investors upwardly revise their valuations 
of the exchange’s stock.    
Under the Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) framework, high-reputation 
exchanges set high listing and disclosure requirements, resulting in more precise 
information available to outsiders when evaluating firms listed on the exchange.  
Exchanges can attempt to use market segments (tiers) to enhance their reputation impact 
by implementing higher standards and forming a new higher tier.  If successful, the 
exchange could exploit the new tier to better compete for listings with other high-
reputation exchanges.  Coffee (2002) refers to this competition through higher listing 
standards as the “race to the top” scenario.  Thus, the following hypotheses will be tested 
to determine if the restructuring had any impact on NASDAQ’s reputation through their 
ability to attract new listings:    
 
H0:  The NASDAQ reorganization had no impact on their competitiveness in 
the marketplace for listings (i.e. no reputation effect). 
 
H2:  The NASDAQ reorganization had a positive impact on their 
competitiveness in the marketplace for listings (i.e. a positive reputation 
effect). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA SOURCES 
 
 
Essay Two has two sample sets.  The first set consists of all NASDAQ-listed 
stocks that were listed on the GSM and NGM for the six months surrounding the 
restructuring.  The GSM is important for analyzing any potential positive asset pricing 
impact when NNM stocks were “elevated” to the new GSM.  The remaining NNM stocks 
that were “left behind” in the new NGM are also analyzed in order to determine if they 
had any negative asset pricing impact for not meeting the new higher standards of the 
GSM.  
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database serves as the primary 
data source for identifying all NASDAQ-listed stocks, as well as to which tier they are 
assigned.  The sample set consists of the 1,210 stocks listed on the GSM and the 1,354 
stocks listed on the NGM from 1 July – 31 Dec 2006 (thus eliminating the NCM).  This 
provides a total of 2,564 stocks for the asset pricing analysis via event study.   
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY 
 
A two-step procedure is used to calculate abnormal returns using the Fama-
French three-factor model (1993) as a benchmark.  In the first stage, the benchmark 
parameters are estimated, using a 255-day estimation period that ends 46 days before 
each event date, using equation 1.   
 
tttjmtjjjt HMLhSMBsRR   ˆˆˆˆ      (1) 
 
 
In equation 1, Rmt represents the rate of return of a market index (S&P 500) for 
day t, SMBt represents the average return on three small market-capitalization portfolios 
minus the average return on three large market-capitalization portfolios, and HMLt 
represents the average return on two high book-to-market equity portfolios minus the 
average return on two low book-to-market equity portfolios, and t is a random variable 
assumed to have an expected value of zero, be homoskedastic, and be uncorrelated with 
Rmt, Rkt (for any k ≠ t), or s (for any s ≠ 1).  Abnormal returns are then estimated in the 
second stage.  The abnormal return will be calculated using equation 2. 
  ttjmtjjjtjtjtjt HMLhSMBsRRRRA ˆˆˆˆˆ      (2) 
 
 
For the event study analysis, I use four measures to analyze abnormal returns in 
order to identify any potential asset pricing effect resulting from NASDAQ’s 
restructuring.  These measures are average abnormal return, cumulative average 
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abnormal return, buy-an-hold abnormal return, and average compounded abnormal 
return.  The functional forms of each abnormal measure are displayed in equations 3-6.   
 
Average Abnormal Return: 
N
A
AAR
N
j
jt
t

 1         (3) 
 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return: 
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Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return: 
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Average Compounded Abnormal Return: 
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The event study test statistic is the non-parametric generalized sign test (Cowan, 
1992).  The generalized sign test controls for the normal asymmetry between positive and 
negative returns during the estimation period.  The generalized sign test is a better test for 
event studies than the Patell test (1976) due to the Patell test’s assumption of cross-
sectional independence in the abnormal return. 
For sensitivity analyses, I use the Fama-French four-factor model with a 
momentum factor, recommended by Carhart (1997), to measure abnormal returns.   
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ttjttjmtjjjt UMDuHMLhSMBsRR   ˆˆˆˆˆ    (7) 
 
 
In equation 7, Rmt, SMBt, and HMLt represents the same variables as the Fama-
French three-factor model.  In addition, UMDt represents the average return on two high 
prior-return portfolios minus the average return on two low prior-return portfolios.  
Additionally, t is a random variable assumed to have an expected value of zero, 
homoskedastic, and uncorrelated with Rmt, Rkt (for any k ≠ t), or s (for any s ≠ 1).  
Abnormal returns are then estimated in the second stage.  The abnormal return will be 
calculated using equation 7. 
 
 tjtjtjmtjjjtjtjtjt UMDuHMLhSMBsRRRRA ˆˆˆˆˆˆ    (8) 
 
The same four measures of abnormal return (equations 3-6) will be used to 
measure any asset pricing impact due to NASDAQ’s restructuring.   
I test for an asset pricing impact using three alternate event dates.  The Press 
Release Date is the date of NASDAQ’s original press release announcing the 
restructuring (15 Feb 2005).  The Identification Date is the date NASDAQ identified the 
specific stocks designated for listing on the new GSM (26 June 2006).  The Effective 
Date is first trading day of the new NASDAQ structure (3 July 2006).   As a component 
of the sensitivity analysis, these alternate dates will consider whether any pricing impact 
occurred on the initial announcement of the restructuring, or on the date that specific 
stocks were identified for each tier, rather than simply the first day of trading on the new 
tier. 
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 The second data set consists of all IPOs that went public in the five years 
surrounding the NASDAQ reorganization (30 months prior until 30 months after).  The 
Field-Ritter dataset identifies all IPOs during this time period.  I exclude all stocks 
without a CRSP share class code of 11 or 12 (excludes all closed end funds, REITs, 
certificates, ADRs, unit trusts, etc.).  The CRSP and Compustat databases provide 
additional company-specific data used in the multivariate analysis.   
An initial analysis of the IPO market from 2004-2008 indicates that a total of 803 
firms conducted IPOs in the 5-year period.  A total of 462 firms conducted IPOs in the 
thirty months before the restructuring, compared with 341 afterwards.  During the 5-year 
sample period, NASDAQ attracted 40% of their IPOs after the restructuring, versus 60% 
in the same timeframe before it, implying that the restructuring may not have helped 
them become more competitive.   
This analysis does take into consideration that not all stocks qualify for listing on 
all three major exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ).  Many firms qualify for 
listing on NASDAQ, but not NYSE, due to NASDAQ’s lower listing requirements.  For 
the analysis in the results section, these smaller firms were excluded from the sample set, 
thereby establishing a condition that firms chose NASDAQ conditional upon their being 
qualified to choose between NASDAQ, AMEX, and NYSE.   
Previous research by Corwin and Harris (2001) on IPO exchange listing choice 
identified that IPOs are more likely to list on the same exchange as their industry peers.  
Additionally, smaller and riskier firms tend to list on NASDAQ.  Consequently, the 
Corwin and Harris study provides three controls for examining any potential impact of 
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the restructuring on NASDAQ’s competitiveness (industry concentration, firm size, and 
firm risk).   
  For this analysis, I’ll conduct a probit model using the control variables 
identified in the Corwin and Harris (2001) study.  The probit model takes the form of: 
 
   ZNASDAQProb *1   
 
where (-) denotes the standard normal distribution,  denotes a vector of coefficients, 
and Z denotes a vector of independent (i.e. explanatory) variables.  In this analysis, the 
dependent variable will equal one if the IPO listed on NASDAQ, and will equal zero 
otherwise (i.e. the firm chose to list on NYSE or AMEX).  The explanatory variables 
comprising Z will include: 
 
-NASDAQ industry share: indicates the percentage of firms within a company’s 
industry, using the four-digit SIC to identify industry, that are listed on NASDAQ 
(peer-firm listings),  
 
- Market value: indicates the IPO’s post-listing market value (shares outstanding 
times share price), 
 
-Standard deviation: indicates the IPO’s level of risk by using the standard 
deviation, as calculated using the five-day close-to-close returns in the 100 trading 
days immediately following its listing, 
 
-Post_Restructuring_IPO: indicates a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO 
occurred after 1 July 2006, and equal zero to otherwise; this variable is the 
variable of interest, and will be interpreted as support for H2 (i.e. the restructuring 
enhanced NASDAQ’s reputation) if positive and significant.   
 
 
 For sensitivity analysis, I also conduct a logistic regression model using the same 
functional form.   
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
 
The results of the event study on the NASDAQ restructuring, first focusing on the 
Global Select Market stocks, are reported in Table 2-1.  Panel A shows the announcement 
effect when NASDAQ first announced the restructuring on 15 February, 2006.  At the 
initial announcement, NASDAQ did not specify which firms would be listed on which 
tiers.  While the event study results do indicate statistically significant negative returns 
for GSM stocks in the days following the initial announcement, the negative returns are 
consistent with the overall movement in GSM stocks in the days leading up to the press 
release.  On average, GSM stocks had a cumulative abnormal return of -2.25% in the 30 
trading days leading up to the announcement.  If you reset the abnormal return to zero 
after the close of trading the day before the announcement, the GSM stocks continued, on 
average, to have a -2.96% abnormal return over the subsequent 30 trading days. 
Similarly, Panel B shows the results around the date NASDAQ identified the 
stocks that would migrate to the GSM.  The results indicate the opposite effect around the 
identification date.  In the 30 trading days after the announcement, GSM stocks, on 
average, had positive abnormal returns.  Nevertheless, this pattern follows the GSM 
market-wide pattern in the days leading up to the announcement.  In the 30 trading days 
before the identification date, GSM stocks had accumulated, on average, an abnormal 
return of 3.44%.  If you reset the abnormal return on the close of trading on the day 
preceding NASDAQ identifying the future GSM stocks, the stocks only gained on 
average an additional 1.25% of abnormal return in the next 30 trading days.   
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Panel C shows the results on the effective date that trading commenced on the 
new GSM, July 3, 2006.  These results are consistent with the identification date (overall 
positive movement in the GSM stock prices in the 30 days leading up to the 
announcement).  Given the short timeframe between the identification date and the 
announcement date (one trading week), this result is not surprising. 
Table 2-2 shows the results of a sensitivity test using the Fama-French Four 
Factor model, which includes Carhart’s momentum factor.  The findings for all three 
announcement dates are similar to the three-factor model.  GSM stocks show post-
announcement abnormal return patterns that are consistent with the short-term 
momentum within the GSM group of stocks leading up to the announcement.  Stocks are 
falling both before and after the press release, and rising both before and after the 
identification and effective dates.  These results are displayed graphically in Figures 2-3 
and 2-4.  Figure 2-3 shows the abnormal returns, starting from the event days, whereas 
Figure 2-4 shows the abnormal returns dating back to the beginning (-30) of the pre-event 
window.   
The stocks eventually designated for the NASDAQ Global Market show a 
complete opposite pattern around the same event dates.  Table 2-3 shows the results of an 
event study on the 1,354 stocks that were “left behind” in the middle tier as a result of the 
restructuring.  While the GSM stocks were clearly trending downward as a group leading 
up to the February 15, 2006 press release, the NGM stocks were trending upward.  The 
results in Panel A indicate that NGM stocks had an average abnormal return of 1.9% in 
the 30 trading days leading up to the press release, and sustained that trend for an 
additional 1.25% of abnormal return in the 30 trading days after the announcement. 
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Similarly, as shown in Panels B-C, the downward trend in NGM stock prices in 
the 30 trading days before the identification and announcement dates was sustained over 
the subsequent 30 trading days.  The Fama-French Four Factor models, shown in Table 
2-4, show the same trends.  Figures 2-5 and 2-6 show the results graphically.  What 
appears in Figure 2-5 to be a positive announcement effect, followed by a sustained 
abnormal return in the subsequent short-term, appears in Figure 2-6 to be little more than 
short-term price momentum.  The findings indicate that you have two significant portions 
of the NASDAQ market moving clearly in two different directions, over two different 
timeframes, as NASDAQ was initially announcing, and then implementing, a major 
reorganization of their listing environment. 
These event study results seem inconsistent with any positive reputation effect 
NASDAQ may have intended.  While a brief analysis of the 0-30 trading day window 
would seem to indicate that GSM stocks may have benefited from being moved onto the 
new tier, and that the NGM stocks may have suffered, their abnormal return patterns were 
no different than in the weeks leading up to the announcement than they were 
immediately afterwards.  Figure 2-7 shows abnormal returns for GSM and NGM stocks 
over the 61-day window surrounding the identification and effective dates.   
These results seem consistent with two possible explanations.  First, the 
reorganization had little to no impact on any NASDAQ-listed firms, as their pricing 
appeared relatively unaffected.  Any positive (negative) pricing impact for GSM (NGM) 
stocks could be explained away by technical analysis of short-term price movements.  
Second, the market may have inferred which companies would fall onto which tiers, and 
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prices started moving well before the firms were officially announced as moving to the 
GSM or NGM.   
If NASDAQ’s new tiered structure benefits firms with any enhanced reputation 
effect, a better test would be to analyze when firms cross from one tier into a new tier.  
As NCM or NGM firms grow, become more profitable, and their stock becomes more 
liquid, they would meet the higher listing standards of the NGM or GSM.  With a 
subsequent move onto a higher tier with better visibility, they could reap a positive 
impact on their stock price through higher levels of investor participation.  Conversely, as 
GSM or NGM firms become less profitable, and their stock becomes less liquid, they 
would fail to meet the continued listing standards of the GSM or NGM, and would drop 
to a lower tier.  With a subsequent move onto a lower tier with less visibility, they could 
face a negative impact on their stock price.   
Tables 2-5 and 2-6 explore this effect as firms cross these boundaries.  Table 2-5 
focuses on firms moving from the NCM to the NGM, or from the NGM to the GSM.  
Panel A reports abnormal returns from the date the firm announced its intention to move 
onto a higher tier, and Panel B reports returns from the effective date (usually only a lag 
of 1-2 trading days).  Most firms announce a rise to a new tier using a formal press 
release, a NASDAQ announcement, or an SEC filing.  Some firms choose not to 
announce the move, or the announcement could not be located.  Thus, the number of 
observations for the announcement date is slightly smaller than for the effective date.  If 
neither an announcement nor an effective date could be established, the firm was thrown 
out of the sample. 
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The analysis from Table 2-5 indicates that upon announcing a move to a higher 
tier, and upon the beginning of trading on the new tier, firms have an immediate positive, 
but non-significant announcement effect, followed by a short-term reversal over the next 
30 trading days.  Both event day windows (-1 to 0, and 0 to +1) are insignificant for both 
the announcement and effective dates, and using both the three-factor and four-factor 
models.  The longer post-event window (+1 to +30) is significant for the effective date, 
and approaching significance for the announcement date.  
Surprisingly, NASDAQ stocks appear to have a negative pricing impact when 
they move onto a higher tier.  Table 2-6 displays results for when stocks move to a lower 
tier.  Even more surprisingly, NASDAQ stocks appear to have a strong positive price 
impact when dropping to a lower tier.  While the immediate price impact doesn’t appear 
to happen, NASDAQ stocks that move onto a lower tier appreciate noticeably in the 30 
trading days immediately after both the announcement and the switch.  This finding is 
significant in 6 of the 8 specifications (three-factor vs. four-factor models, announcement 
vs. effective dates, and cumulative vs. compound returns).   
Figure 2-8 shows the stock pricing impact.  Note that in contrast to the NASDAQ 
press release, announcement, and effective dates for starting the new tiered structure, 
firms crossing tiers show some momentum in their return patterns in the before two 
weeks prior to switching, and continued momentum immediately afterwards.  Firms that 
drop to a lower tier see a slight price increase, and firms that rise to a higher tier see their 
prices fall slightly.  However, this analysis does not provide strong evidence of a pricing 
impact given the small sample size and the influence of many small price stocks (i.e. 
penny stocks) within the sample.  
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Thus far, the analysis doesn’t indicate any positive reputation effect for NASDAQ 
firms resulting from the new tiered structure.  The announcement effects around the 
restructuring are more consistent with a momentum effect within tiers, rather than an 
immediate impact resulting from being associated with the NASDAQ listing 
environment.  Further, NASDAQ stocks moving down to lower tiers seem to benefit, 
while firms moving up towards (or onto) the highest tier seem to incur a cost. 
Another method of testing for any benefits to NASDAQ’s reputation resulting 
from having the “highest listing standards in the world” is to test for an enhanced 
competitiveness in the marketplace for listings.  If Bob Greifeld’s promotion of the new 
tier as “a blue chip market for blue chip companies” truly signaled to the marketplace that 
NASDAQ is the best listing environment for new publicly traded firms, NASDAQ 
should be better able to compete for IPOs.     
Tables 2-7 through 2-9 present the findings of an analysis of NASDAQ’s ability 
to compete for IPOs after the reorganization.  Using the same approach as Corwin & 
Harris (2001), I analyze the probability of NASDAQ attracting a listing around the 
restructuring timeframe.  Table 2-7 provides descriptive statistics on market for IPOs 
from 2004-2008.   
NASDAQ has the vast majority of IPO listings over the sample period, but the 
IPO market has slowed down since the July 2006 restructuring.  The total number of 
IPOs in the 30 months immediately after NASDAQ’s restructuring dropped by over 26% 
from the preceding 30 months.  Additionally, their rate of attracting IPOs has dropped 
from 67.7% to 60.1%.   
86 
 
While this initial analysis indicates the restructuring hasn’t helped NASDAQ to 
better attract new IPOs, the Corwin & Harris (2001) approach provides a better 
framework.  They found that smaller, riskier firms tend to list on NASDAQ, and firms 
tend to list on the exchange where their industry piers are listed.  Table 2-8 provides 
correlations on these variables for all IPOs from 2004-2008.  Consistent with their 
findings, the analysis shows a negative correlation between firm size and a firm listing on 
NASDAQ.  The analysis also shows positive correlations between the concentration of 
industry peers being listed on NASDAQ and the risk of a firm’s stock. 
Table 2-9 shows both Probit and Logit estimations for the probability of 
NASDAQ attracting an IPO.  Model 1 shows a significant relationship between the same 
variables previously identified in the literature by Corwin & Harris (2001).  All variable 
coefficients are in the expected directions.  Larger firms are associated with a lower 
probability of NASDAQ attracting the IPO, and greater risk and greater industry 
concentration on NASDAQ are associated with a higher probability of NASDAQ 
attracting the IPO.  The model is significant with a Log Likelihood value of 409.77.   
Model 2 includes the dummy variable (Post Reorg) for whether or not the IPO 
listed after NASDAQ’s restructuring.  The variable loads as significant and negative, 
indicating that post-reorganization, NASDAQ may have a lower probability of attracting 
the IPO.  Models 4 and 5 repeat the analysis using a logistic regression approach as a 
sensitivity analysis.  As with the Probit model, all coefficients are significant, in the same 
direction, and the overall model is highly significant.  All four specifications have similar 
Psuedo r2, and the models with the Post Reorg variable improve slightly on the Psuedo r2.  
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A supplemental test of the control variables (not reported) indicates that IPO firm 
sizes increased over the later half of the sample period.  Since larger companies have 
been shown to have a higher probability of listing on the NYSE (Corwin & Harris, 2001), 
larger firm sizes in the second half of the sample period could also help explain the lower 
probability of NASDAQ attracting an IPO, independent of any restructuring.  Since IPO 
firm sizes increased over time, Model 3 provides an interaction variable that helps 
account for this growth over the later portion of the sample period.  I create the 
interaction variable by multiplying the firm size (Ln(MktCap)) by the dummy variable 
for the time frame after the restructuring (PostReorg).   
Given a significantly larger average firm size in the later half of the sample 
period, the interaction variable should control for this effect.  The analysis from Model 3 
indicates that the interaction variable is significantly different than zero, and that the 
variable of interest (PostReorg) is still significant, and negative.  This finding is 
consistent with the notion that the restructuring may not have helped NASDAQ attract 
new IPO listings.  This analysis does not clearly demonstrate causality, but it does 
indicate that NASDAQ appears to have a diminished competitiveness in the IPO market 
during the same time frame after the restructuring. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
NASDAQ intended for their restructuring to signal to the marketplace that it was 
a world-class marketplace with the highest listing standards in the world.  As a result, 
NASDAQ hoped to better compete for newly listed firms, and existing NASDAQ firms 
could benefit from the reputation effect as NASDAQ moved to better compete with 
NYSE.  The empirical data is not consistent with a reputation effect resulting from the 
restructuring.  NASDAQ firms received no apparent asset pricing impact from a) the 
initial restructuring announcement, b) when the firms were identified for each tier, and c) 
when trading commenced under the new listing structure.   
In fact, whatever momentum the NASDAQ-listed stocks had (before the 
announcements) appeared relatively uninterrupted as a result of NASDAQ’s press 
releases over the Spring and Summer of 2006.  Additionally, NASDAQ firms appear to 
benefit when moving down the scale towards the bottom tier, and to suffer when moving 
towards the upper tier.  This finding is inconsistent with either a reputation effect or a 
visibility effect that one would expect when moving up towards the top of the listing 
environment or down towards the bottom.   
As a marketplace, the evidence from this study is consistent with the notion that 
the restructuring appears to have had no positive impact on NASDAQ’s ability to attract 
new IPO listings.  NASDAQ does not appear to be more competitive for new listings 
than it was before that restructuring.  Chuck Jaffe may be right; the restructuring may 
very well have been about marketing.  Unfortunately, the marketing doesn’t appear to 
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have helped.  The results of this study fail to reject the null hypothesis that the NASDAQ 
reorganization had no positive impact on their reputation (i.e. no reputation effect). 
Future studies to build upon this essay could focus on a number of issues.  First, 
why did the tiers appear to move in different directions?  When the NGM stocks were 
moving up, the GSM stocks were moving down, and vice versa.  Was this an anomaly 
restricted to this sample period, or do these patterns occur more often?  If so, what is the 
source of the tiers exhibiting movements in opposite directions?  Second, the analysis is 
consistent with the idea that NASDAQ may not be more competitive in the IPO market 
as a result of the restructuring.  Further tests of this finding could further isolate the 
cause-effect relationship, if any, between the restructuring and competition in the IPO 
marketplace.   
A related study could look at NASDAQ’s ability to keep firms from moving to 
the NYSE.  If the IPO market is indicative of an offensive approach towards seeking 
greater market share, an alternative outcome would be a defensive approach towards 
protecting the market share you currently have.  Plus, NASDAQ’s desire from the 
restructuring may be to compete at the top of the market for large (blue chip) firms, while 
accepting risk against NYSE Arca regarding market share in smaller firms.  A future 
study could isolate the largest firms and NASDAQ’s ability to compete for their listings.     
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Table 2-1: Event Study Results, NASDAQ Global Select Market (FF3FM). 
 
Day
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30 -0.03% -0.03% 581:628 0.009 0.28% 0.28% 733:487 8.601*** 0.28% 0.28% 720:500 7.851***
-15 -0.08% -2.37% 501:709 -4.622*** -0.16% 1.75% 543:679 -2.342** 0.51% 1.62% 782:440 11.341***
-14 0.04% -2.33% 585:625 0.212 0.41% 2.16% 800:422 12.376*** 0.74% 2.36% 826:396 13.861***
-13 -0.16% -2.49% 522:688 -3.413*** 0.15% 2.31% 675:547 5.218*** -0.05% 2.31% 531:691 -3.034***
-12 -0.39% -2.88% 438:772 -8.247*** 0.57% 2.88% 797:425 12.204*** -0.11% 2.20% 542:680 -2.404**
-11 -0.28% -3.16% 479:731 -5.888*** -0.23% 2.65% 502:720 -4.690*** -0.22% 1.98% 532:690 -2.976***
-10 -0.05% -3.21% 549:661 -1.86* 0.51% 3.16% 787:435 11.632*** 0.09% 2.07% 646:576 3.552***
-9 -0.20% -3.41% 505:705 -4.392*** 0.75% 3.91% 824:398 13.751*** -0.10% 1.97% 612:610 1.605
-8 -0.08% -3.49% 583:627 0.097 -0.05% 3.86% 531:691 -3.029*** -0.02% 1.95% 527:695 -3.263***
-7 0.07% -3.42% 595:615 0.787 -0.13% 3.73% 543:679 -2.342** 0.10% 2.05% 666:556 4.698***
-6 0.17% -3.25% 690:520 6.253*** -0.22% 3.51% 530:692 -3.086*** -0.14% 1.91% 516:706 -3.893***
-5 0.11% -3.14% 596:614 0.845 0.10% 3.61% 654:568 4.015*** 0.34% 2.25% 713:509 7.389***
-4 -0.24% -3.38% 491:719 -5.197*** -0.10% 3.51% 608:614 1.381 0.04% 2.29% 647:575 3.610***
-3 0.15% -3.23% 707:503 7.231*** -0.02% 3.49% 519:703 -3.716*** 0.14% 2.43% 668:554 4.812***
-2 0.11% -3.12% 656:554 4.297*** 0.09% 3.58% 659:563 4.301*** 0.01% 2.44% 593:629 0.517
-1 0.04% -2.25% 614:596 1.880* -0.14% 3.44% 514:708 -4.003*** -0.56% 1.88% 417:805 -9.562***
0 -0.01% -0.01% 553:657 -1.63 0.33% 0.33% 709:513 7.165*** -0.23% -0.23% 499:723 -4.866***
1 -0.19% -0.20% 508:702 -4.219*** 0.04% 0.37% 649:573 3.729*** -0.04% -0.27% 579:643 -0.285
2 -0.32% -0.52% 471:739 -6.348*** 0.13% 0.50% 670:552 4.931*** -0.09% -0.36% 567:655 -0.972
3 -0.25% -0.77% 499:711 -4.737*** 0.00% 0.50% 590:632 0.35 0.13% -0.23% 694:528 6.301***
4 0.10% -0.67% 667:543 4.930*** -0.57% -0.07% 416:806 -9.615*** 0.23% 0.00% 745:477 9.222***
5 -0.23% -0.90% 484:726 -5.600*** -0.23% -0.30% 497:725 -4.976*** 0.14% 0.14% 627:595 2.464**
6 0.01% -0.89% 549:661 -1.860* -0.04% -0.34% 582:640 -0.108 -0.11% 0.03% 565:657 -1.086
7 -0.06% -0.95% 545:665 -2.090** -0.09% -0.43% 570:652 -0.796 0.19% 0.22% 715:507 7.504***
8 -0.21% -1.16% 553:657 -1.63 0.13% -0.30% 696:526 6.420*** 0.16% 0.38% 709:513 7.160***
9 -0.06% -1.22% 533:677 -2.78*** 0.22% -0.08% 741:481 8.997*** 0.51% 0.89% 798:424 12.257***
10 -0.24% -1.46% 476:734 -6.060*** 0.14% 0.06% 622:600 2.182* 0.46% 1.35% 761:461 10.138***
11 -0.17% -1.63% 492:718 -5.140*** -0.11% -0.05% 569:653 -0.853 -0.11% 1.24% 588:634 0.231
12 -0.21% -1.84% 556:653 -1.43 0.20% 0.15% 718:504 7.680*** 0.04% 1.28% 652:570 3.896***
13 0.30% -1.54% 734:475 8.816*** 0.16% 0.31% 708:514 7.108*** 0.16% 1.44% 697:525 6.473***
14 0.15% -1.39% 678:531 5.593*** 0.51% 0.82% 804:418 12.605*** 0.26% 1.70% 668:554 4.812***
15 -0.01% -1.40% 555:655 -1.515 0.45% 1.27% 760:462 10.086*** -0.03% 1.67% 561:661 -1.315
30 -0.32% -2.96% 451:759 -7.499*** 0.11% 1.25% 636:584 3.041*** 0.21% 2.28% 621:597 2.234**
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30,-2 -3.12% -8.304*** -3.42% -9.052*** 3.59% 11.517*** 3.29% 11.345*** 2.42% 10.196*** 2.12% 9.337***
-1,0 0.03% 1.593 0.03% 1.362 0.19% 3.385*** 0.18% 3.156*** -0.79% -9.677*** -0.81% -9.906***
0,+1 -0.20% -3.356*** -0.20% -3.413*** 0.37% 8.024*** 0.36% 7.737*** -0.27% -3.034*** -0.28% -3.148***
+1,+30 -2.94% -7.902*** -3.14% -9.398*** 0.92% 6.592*** 0.62% 5.619*** 2.52% 9.680*** 2.25% 8.592***
n=1,210         *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the .1, .05, .and .01 levels of significance.
This table reports the results of an event study on the creation of the new three-tiered listing structure for the NASDAQ Stock Exchange, specifically focusing on firms that would become 
listed on the highest tier (Global Select Market).  The Press Release Date  column reports the average and cumulative abnormal returns for the former NASDAQ National Market firms that 
would eventually qualify for listing on the Global Select Market.  The event date is February 15th, 2006, the date of NASDAQ's initial press release announcing the new tier.  The 
Identification Date  column reports the average and cumulative abnormal returns for same NASDAQ National Market firms that would eventually qualify for listing on the Global Select 
Market.  The event date is June 26th, 2006, the date NASDAQ identified which firms qualified for listing on the Global Select Market.  The Effective Date column reports the average and 
cumulative abnormal returns for when the same firms began trading on the Global Select Market.  The event date is July 3rd, 2006, the date that NASDAQ initiated trading on the new Global 
Select Market.
Abnormal returns are calculated using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model:
Panel A: Press Release Date Panel B: Identification Date Panel C: Effective Date
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Table 2-2: Event Study Results, NASDAQ Global Select Market (FF4FM). 
 
Day
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30 -0.03% -0.03% 592:617 0.636 0.26% 0.26% 712:508 7.365*** 0.28% 0.28% 721:499 7.868***
-15 -0.07% -2.36% 505:705 -4.398*** -0.17% 1.62% 537:685 -2.717*** 0.46% 1.47% 776:446 10.956***
-14 0.04% -2.32% 583:627 0.09 0.41% 2.03% 791:431 11.829*** 0.74% 2.21% 826:396 13.820***
-13 -0.16% -2.48% 522:688 -3.420*** 0.13% 2.16% 657:565 4.155*** -0.01% 2.20% 568:654 -0.955
-12 -0.39% -2.87% 433:777 -8.541*** 0.55% 2.71% 786:436 11.542*** -0.08% 2.12% 559:663 -1.47
-11 -0.28% -3.15% 479:731 -5.894*** -0.23% 2.48% 505:717 -4.550*** -0.21% 1.91% 534:688 -2.902***
-10 -0.05% -3.20% 544:666 -2.154** 0.48% 2.96% 781:441 11.256*** 0.09% 2.00% 646:576 3.512***
-9 -0.20% -3.40% 507:703 -4.283*** 0.75% 3.71% 823:399 13.661*** -0.10% 1.90% 612:610 1.565
-8 -0.08% -3.48% 576:634 -0.313 -0.02% 3.69% 558:664 -1.515 0.02% 1.92% 545:677 -2.272**
-7 0.07% -3.41% 587:623 0.32 -0.11% 3.58% 551:671 -1.915* 0.10% 2.02% 665:557 4.600***
-6 0.18% -3.23% 679:531 5.614*** -0.21% 3.37% 536:686 -2.774*** -0.12% 1.90% 528:694 -3.246***
-5 0.11% -3.12% 590:620 0.493 0.10% 3.47% 654:568 3.983*** 0.33% 2.23% 709:513 7.119***
-4 -0.23% -3.35% 487:723 -5.434*** -0.10% 3.37% 612:610 1.578 0.03% 2.26% 644:578 3.397***
-3 0.16% -3.19% 701:509 6.880*** 0.00% 3.37% 532:690 -3.003** 0.12% 2.38% 668:554 4.772***
-2 0.11% -3.08% 649:561 3.888*** 0.09% 3.46% 660:562 4.327*** 0.03% 2.41% 602:620 0.992
-1 0.04% -3.04% 615:595 1.931* -0.13% 3.33% 524:698 -3.462*** -0.56% 1.85% 416:806 -9.659***
0 -0.01% -0.01% 553:657 -1.636 0.32% 0.32% 707:515 7.018*** -0.21% -0.21% 503:719 -4.677***
1 -0.20% -0.21% 526:684 -3.190*** 0.03% 0.35% 641:581 3.239*** -0.06% -0.27% 566:656 -1.07
2 -0.32% -0.53% 471:739 -6.354*** 0.12% 0.47% 667:555 4.728*** -0.10% -0.37% 564:658 -1.184
3 -0.25% -0.78% 504:706 -4.456*** 0.02% 0.49% 601:621 0.948 0.09% -0.28% 650:572 3.741***
4 0.10% -0.68% 667:543 4.923*** -0.57% -0.08% 418:804 -9.532*** 0.19% -0.09% 733:489 8.494***
5 -0.24% -0.92% 491:719 -5.204*** -0.22% -0.30% 502:720 -4.721*** 0.15% 0.06% 633:589 2.767***
6 0.01% -0.91% 546:664 -2.039** -0.06% -0.36% 571:651 -0.77 -0.09% -0.03% 576:646 -0.497
7 -0.07% -0.98% 538:672 -2.499** -0.10% -0.46% 559:663 -1.457 0.19% 0.16% 717:505 7.578***
8 -0.21% -1.19% 552:658 -1.694* 0.09% -0.37% 654:568 3.983*** 0.16% 0.32% 712:510 7.291***
9 -0.07% -1.26% 551:659 -1.751* 0.19% -0.18% 729:493 8.278*** 0.50% 0.82% 794:428 11.987***
10 -0.24% -1.50% 477:733 -6.009*** 0.15% -0.03% 626:596 2.380** 0.46% 1.28% 757:465 9.868***
11 -0.17% -1.67% 487:723 -5.434*** -0.10% -0.13% 582:640 -0.14 -0.10% 1.18% 586:636 0.076
12 -0.20% -1.87% 545:664 -2.070** 0.19% 0.06% 719:503 7.705*** 0.03% 1.21% 653:569 3.913***
13 0.30% -1.57% 740:469 9.155*** 0.16% 0.22% 714:508 7.419*** 0.13% 1.34% 674:548 5.115***
14 0.15% -1.42% 671:538 5.183*** 0.50% 0.72% 803:419 12.516*** 0.27% 1.61% 668:554 4.772***
15 -0.01% -1.43% 551:659 -1.751* 0.45% 1.17% 763:459 10.225*** -0.04% 1.57% 560:662 -1.413
30 -0.32% -2.98% 458:752 -7.102*** 0.11% 1.14% 634:586 2.895*** 0.22% 2.20% 634:584 2.939***
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30,-2 -3.09% -8.483*** -3.39% -9.404*** 3.45% 11.428*** 3.14% 10.512*** 2.40% 10.097*** 2.09% 9.009***
-1,0 0.02% 1.586 0.03% 1.471 0.19% 3.525*** 0.19% 3.468*** -0.77% -9.602*** -0.79% -9.774***
0,+1 -0.21% -2.384** -0.21% -2.499** 0.35% 8.164*** 0.35% 7.935*** -0.27% -3.074*** -0.28% -3.188***
+1,+30 -2.95% -8.138*** -3.14% -9.692*** 0.82% 6.388*** 0.53% 5.358*** 2.39% 10.040*** 2.13% 8.780***
This table reports the results of an event study on the creation of the new three-tiered listing structure for the NASDAQ Stock Exchange, specifically focusing on firms that 
would become listed on the highest tier (Global Select Market).  The Press Release Date  column reports the average and cumulative abnormal returns for the former 
NASDAQ National Market firms that would eventually qualify for listing on the Global Select Market.  The event date is February 15th, 2006, the date of NASDAQ's initial 
press release announcing the new tier.  The Identification Date  column reports the average and cumulative abnormal returns for same NASDAQ National Market firms that 
would eventually qualify for listing on the Global Select Market.  The event date is June 26th, 2006, the date NASDAQ identified which firms qualified for listing on the Global 
Select Market.  The Effective Date column reports the average and cumulative abnormal returns for when the same firms began trading on the Global Select Market.  The 
event date is July 3rd, 2006, the date that NASDAQ initiated trading on the new Global Select Market.
Abnormal returns are calculated using the Fama-French 4-Factor Model:
Panel A: Press Release Date Panel B: Identification Date Panel C: Effective Date
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Table 2-3: Event Study Results, NASDAQ Global Market (FF3FM). 
 
Day
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30 -0.37% -0.37% 550:803 -5.230*** -0.18% -0.18% 683:724 0.96 0.02% 0.02% 704:705 2.070**
-15 -0.11% 1.32% 608:745 -2.073** 0.14% -0.24% 717:692 2.723*** -0.15% -0.04% 733:677 3.591***
-14 0.04% 1.36% 587:766 -3.216*** -0.21% -0.45% 689:720 1.229 -0.47% -0.51% 680:730 0.764
-13 -0.04% 1.32% 595:758 -2.781*** -0.01% -0.46% 696:713 1.602 -0.13% -0.64% 641:769 -1.317
-12 0.39% 1.71% 629:724 -0.93 -0.23% -0.69% 662:747 -0.212 0.03% -0.61% 626:785 -2.141**
-11 0.10% 1.81% 639:714 -0.386 0.06% -0.63% 694:715 1.496 -0.01% -0.62% 661:750 -0.275
-10 0.13% 1.94% 662:691 0.866 -0.15% -0.78% 725:684 3.150*** -0.18% -0.80% 695:716 1.538
-9 0.12% 2.06% 661:692 0.811 -0.46% -1.24% 674:735 0.428 0.10% -0.70% 685:726 1.005
-8 -0.03% 2.03% 675:678 1.573 -0.14% -1.38% 636:773 -1.599 -0.17% -0.87% 612:799 -2.888**
-7 0.00% 2.03% 643:710 -0.168 0.02% -1.36% 612:798 -2.904*** -0.21% -1.08% 656:754 -0.517
-6 0.02% 2.05% 674:679 1.519 -0.02% -1.38% 660:750 -0.344 -0.07% -1.15% 627:784 -2.088**
-5 0.03% 2.08% 649:704 0.158 -0.18% -1.56% 696:714 1.577 -0.25% -1.40% 632:778 -1.797*
-4 0.00% 2.08% 633:720 -0.713 0.09% -1.47% 688:722 1.15 -0.19% -1.59% 655:756 -0.595
-3 -0.08% 2.00% 654:699 0.43 -0.17% -1.64% 611:799 -2.958*** 0.03% -1.56% 700:711 1.805*
-2 0.19% 2.19% 688:665 2.281** -0.20% -1.84% 657:752 -0.479 -0.08% -1.64% 650:761 -0.862
-1 -0.09% 2.10% 630:723 -0.876 -0.06% -1.90% 623:787 -2.317** 0.29% -1.35% 706:705 2.125**
0 0.15% 0.15% 651:702 0.267 -0.25% -0.25% 630:779 -1.920* -0.16% -0.16% 651:760 -0.808
1 0.05% 0.20% 641:712 -0.277 -0.19% -0.44% 650:760 -0.877 0.23% 0.07% 707:704 2.178**
2 0.03% 0.23% 627:726 -1.039 0.03% -0.41% 705:705 2.057** -0.01% 0.06% 697:714 1.645
3 -0.12% 0.11% 609:744 -2.019** -0.08% -0.49% 650:760 -0.877 -0.10% -0.04% 729:682 3.351***
4 -0.05% 0.06% 632:721 -0.767 0.30% -0.19% 710:700 2.323** -0.31% -0.35% 688:723 1.165
5 -0.04% 0.02% 616:737 -1.638 -0.17% -0.36% 652:758 -0.771 0.09% -0.26% 685:726 1.005
6 0.06% 0.08% 629:724 -0.93 0.23% -0.13% 703:707 1.950* -0.02% -0.28% 657:754 -0.488
7 0.13% 0.21% 644:709 -0.114 -0.02% -0.15% 689:721 1.203 -0.38% -0.66% 641:770 -1.342
8 0.13% 0.34% 693:660 2.553** -0.10% -0.25% 730:680 3.390*** -0.23% -0.89% 666:745 -0.008
9 0.07% 0.41% 637:716 -0.495 -0.31% -0.56% 693:717 1.416 -0.25% -1.14% 680:731 0.738
10 -0.01% 0.40% 630:723 -0.876 0.09% -0.47% 683:727 0.883 -0.14% -1.28% 700:711 1.805*
11 0.17% 0.57% 654:699 0.43 -0.02% -0.49% 650:760 -0.877 0.07% -1.21% 689:722 1.218
12 0.12% 0.69% 694:659 2.608*** -0.37% -0.86% 645:765 -1.144 0.10% -1.11% 757:654 4.844***
13 -0.05% 0.64% 700:653 2.934*** -0.23% -1.09% 670:740 0.19 -0.20% -1.31% 680:731 0.738
14 -0.03% 0.61% 667:686 1.138 -0.25% -1.34% 672:738 0.296 -0.25% -1.56% 616:795 -2.675***
15 0.02% 0.63% 674:679 1.519 -0.14% -1.48% 707:703 2.163** 0.01% -1.55% 671:740 0.258
30 0.19% 1.24% 638:716 -0.466 -0.08% -2.46% 687:722 1.122 -0.10% -2.92% 635:772 -1.563
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30,-2 2.21% 3.805*** 2.01% 2.444** -1.81% -2.584*** -2.37% -4.184*** -1.60% -1.128 -2.13% -3.315***
-1,0 0.06% -0.44 0.07% -0.604 -0.31% -4.184*** -0.31% -4.238*** 0.14% 1.165 0.10% 0.898
0,+1 0.21% 0.594 0.21% 0.376 -0.43% -2.798*** -0.44% -3.011*** 0.07% 0.685 0.06% 0.045
+1,+30 1.11% 2.363** 0.92% 0.622 -2.21% 0.296 -3.01% -2.371** -2.77% -1.875* -3.22% -3.528***
n=1,354         *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels of significance.
This table reports the results of an event study on the creation of the new three-tiered listing structure for the NASDAQ Stock Exchange, specifically focusing on firms that would be 
recategorized as NASDAQ Global Market stocks (the middle tier).  The Press Release Date  column reports the average and cumulative abnormal returns for the former NASDAQ National 
Market firms that would eventually list on the Global Market.  The event date is February 15th, 2006, the date of NASDAQ's initial press release announcing the new, three-tiered structure.  
The Identification Date  column reports the average and cumulative abnormal returns for same NASDAQ National Market firms that would be recategorized as NASDAQ Global Market 
stocks.  The event date is June 26th, 2006, the date that NASDAQ announced which specific NASDAQ National Market firms qualified for listing on the new Global Select Market (and by 
default, which didn't).  The Effective Date  column reports the average and cumulative abnormal returns for when the same former NASDAQ National Market firms began trading on the 
Global Market.  The event date is July 3rd, 2006, the date that NASDAQ initiated trading on the Global Market. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model:
Panel A: Press Release Date Panel B: Identification Date Panel C: Effective Date
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Table 2-4: Event Study Results, NASDAQ Global Market (FF4FM).  
 
Day
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Positive/
Negative
Ratio
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30 -0.31% -0.31% 564:789 -4.483*** -0.22% -0.22% 668:737 0.181 0.02% 0.02% 704:705 2.002**
-15 -0.14% 1.25% 586:767 -3.285*** 0.12% -0.45% 704:703 2.052** -0.17% -0.17% 701:709 1.816*
-14 0.04% 1.29% 585:768 -3.340*** -0.21% -0.66% 679:728 0.717 -0.46% -0.63% 677:733 0.536
-13 -0.03% 1.26% 601:752 -2.469** -0.05% -0.71% 681:726 0.824 -0.11% -0.74% 655:755 -0.638
-12 0.39% 1.65% 623:730 -1.271 -0.26% -0.97% 668:739 0.13 0.04% -0.70% 626:785 -2.209**
-11 0.11% 1.76% 641:712 -0.292 0.06% -0.91% 688:719 1.198 -0.01% -0.71% 669:742 0.084
-10 0.11% 1.87% 665:688 1.014 -0.20% -1.11% 704:703 2.052** -0.17% -0.88% 695:716 1.47
-9 0.13% 2.00% 662:691 0.851 -0.46% -1.57% 673:734 0.397 0.10% -0.78% 689:722 1.15
-8 -0.02% 1.98% 679:674 1.776* -0.09% -1.66% 647:760 -0.991 -0.15% -0.93% 624:787 -2.316**
-7 -0.02% 1.96% 629:724 -0.945 0.06% -1.60% 616:792 -2.671*** -0.20% -1.13% 660:750 -0.371
-6 -0.03% 1.93% 664:689 0.96 0.00% -1.60% 668:740 0.105 -0.06% -1.19% 631:780 -1.943*
-5 0.02% 1.95% 638:715 -0.455 -0.18% -1.78% 694:714 1.492 -0.26% -1.45% 623:787 -2.345**
-4 -0.03% 1.92% 612:741 -1.870* 0.10% -1.68% 689:719 1.226 -0.19% -1.64% 652:759 -0.823
-3 -0.09% 1.83% 642:711 -0.237 -0.12% -1.80% 630:778 -1.924* 0.02% -1.62% 698:713 1.63
-2 0.17% 2.00% 669:684 1.232 -0.20% -2.00% 657:750 -0.457 -0.07% -1.69% 654:757 -0.716
-1 -0.10% 1.90% 623:730 -1.271 -0.04% -2.04% 630:778 -1.924* 0.29% -1.40% 707:704 2.110**
0 0.17% 0.17% 661:692 0.797 -0.26% -0.26% 622:785 -2.326** -0.15% -0.15% 649:762 -0.983
1 0.10% 0.27% 650:703 0.198 -0.19% -0.45% 651:757 -0.803 0.22% 0.07% 706:705 2.056**
2 0.02% 0.29% 626:727 -1.108 0.02% -0.43% 695:713 1.546 -0.02% 0.05% 684:727 0.883
3 -0.11% 0.18% 619:734 -1.489 -0.06% -0.49% 657:751 -0.483 -0.13% -0.08% 710:701 2.270**
4 -0.05% 0.13% 624:729 -1.217 0.29% -0.20% 706:702 2.133** -0.34% -0.42% 676:735 0.457
5 -0.02% 0.11% 619:734 -1.489 -0.14% -0.34% 663:745 -0.162 0.09% -0.33% 688:723 1.097
6 0.05% 0.16% 629:724 -0.945 0.21% -0.13% 700:708 1.813* -0.01% -0.34% 666:745 -0.076
7 0.16% 0.32% 654:699 0.416 -0.03% -0.16% 685:723 1.012 -0.37% -0.71% 640:771 -1.463
8 0.10% 0.42% 688:665 2.266** -0.15% -0.31% 709:699 2.293** -0.22% -0.93% 670:741 0.137
9 0.13% 0.55% 656:697 0.525 -0.36% -0.67% 675:733 0.478 -0.26% -1.19% 680:731 0.67
10 0.02% 0.57% 650:703 0.198 0.10% -0.57% 685:723 1.012 -0.15% -1.34% 702:709 1.843*
11 0.16% 0.73% 652:701 0.307 0.00% -0.57% 666:742 -0.002 0.06% -1.28% 686:725 0.99
12 0.09% 0.82% 681:672 1.885* -0.37% -0.94% 640:768 -1.39 0.10% -1.18% 758:653 4.829***
13 -0.09% 0.73% 689:664 2.321** -0.22% -1.16% 672:736 0.318 -0.22% -1.40% 679:732 0.617
14 -0.05% 0.68% 659:694 0.688 -0.27% -1.43% 670:738 0.211 -0.26% -1.66% 613:798 -2.902***
15 -0.02% 0.66% 657:696 0.579 -0.14% -1.57% 708:700 2.240** 0.00% -1.66% 664:747 -0.183
30 0.17% 1.25% 627:727 -1.079 -0.08% -2.60% 689:718 1.251 -0.10% -3.06% 639:768 -1.417
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30,-2 1.78% 1.776* 1.98% 3.355*** -2.01% -2.297** -2.58% -3.685*** -1.67% -1.303 -2.22% -3.489***
-1,0 0.07% -0.564 0.07% -0.564 -0.30% -4.059*** -0.30% -4.272*** 0.14% 1.203 0.10% 0.51
0,+1 0.28% 1.014 0.28% 1.178 -0.45% -3.258*** -0.46% -3.418*** 0.07% 0.777 0.06% 0.297
+1,+30 0.91% 0.553 1.11% 2.294** -2.33% -0.483 -3.16% -2.671*** -2.91% -1.623 -3.39% -3.702***
n=1,354         *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels of significance.
This table reports the results of an event study on the creation of the new three-tiered listing structure for the NASDAQ Stock Exchange, specifically focusing on firms that 
would be recategorized as NASDAQ Global Market stocks (the middle tier).  The Press Release Date  column reports the average and cumulative abnormal returns for the 
former NASDAQ National Market firms that would eventually list on the Global Market.  The event date is February 15th, 2006, the date of NASDAQ's initial press release 
announcing the new, three-tiered structure.  The Identification Date  column reports the average and cumulative abnormal returns for same NASDAQ National Market firms 
that would be recategorized as NASDAQ Global Market stocks.  The event date is June 26th, 2006, the date that NASDAQ announced which specific NASDAQ National 
Market firms qualified for listing on the new Global Select Market (and by default, which didn't).  The Effective Date  column reports the average and cumulative abnormal 
returns for when the same former NASDAQ National Market firms began trading on the Global Market.  The event date is July 3rd, 2006, the date that NASDAQ initiated 
trading on the Global Market. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the Fama-French 4-Factor Model:
Panel A: Press Release Date Panel B: Identification Date Panel C: Effective Date
 tjttjmtjjjtjtjtjt UMDuHMLhSMBsRRRRA ˆˆˆˆˆˆ  
94 
 
Table 2-5: Event Study Results, Stocks Moving to Higher Tier. 
  
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30 0.03% 0.03% 0.432 0.12% 0.12% 0.647 0.14% 0.14% 0.695 0.18% 0.18% 0.641
-15 -0.94% -0.81% -2.543** -0.97% -1.20% -2.326** -0.47% -0.37% -1.543 -0.53% -0.73% -1.596
-14 -0.09% -0.90% -0.92 -0.03% -1.23% -0.434 -0.04% -0.41% -0.303 0.00% -0.73% -0.353
-13 -0.32% -1.22% 0.162 -0.30% -1.53% 0.107 -0.11% -0.52% -0.313 -0.06% -0.79% 0.144
-12 0.44% -0.78% -0.108 0.51% -1.02% 0.107 -0.54% -1.06% -0.549 -0.54% -1.33% -0.602
-11 0.76% -0.02% 0.973 0.71% -0.31% 0.918 0.53% -0.53% 0.695 0.49% -0.84% 0.641
-10 0.64% 0.62% 0.432 0.62% 0.31% -0.434 0.88% 0.35% 0.695 0.83% -0.01% 0.641
-9 -0.09% 0.53% 0.432 -0.10% 0.21% 0.377 -0.11% 0.24% -1.046 -0.14% -0.15% -1.099
-8 0.37% 0.90% 0.703 0.38% 0.59% 0.377 -0.50% -0.26% -1.046 -0.39% -0.54% -0.85
-7 -0.71% 0.19% -1.731* -0.60% -0.01% -1.786* -0.24% -0.50% -0.797 -0.28% -0.82% -0.85
-6 -0.39% -0.20% 0.162 -0.40% -0.41% -0.434 -0.39% -0.89% -0.051 -0.36% -1.18% -0.602
-5 -0.07% -0.27% -0.92 -0.13% -0.54% -0.975 0.08% -0.81% 0.446 -0.01% -1.19% 0.144
-4 -0.76% -1.03% -0.379 -0.88% -1.42% -0.434 -0.01% -0.82% -0.311 -0.09% -1.28% -1.099
-3 0.40% -0.63% 0.703 0.38% -1.04% 0.377 -0.02% -0.84% -0.051 -0.03% -1.31% -0.105
-2 -0.59% -1.22% -0.108 -0.61% -1.65% -0.434 -0.17% -1.01% -0.549 -0.09% -1.40% -0.105
-1 -0.25% -1.47% -0.92 -0.28% -1.93% -0.704 -0.67% -1.68% -0.797 -0.72% -2.12% -1.099
0 0.74% -0.73% 1.244 0.74% -1.19% 1.188 0.61% -1.07% 1.192 0.57% -1.55% 0.89
1 -0.71% -1.44% -0.649 -0.77% -1.96% -1.245 -0.59% -1.66% 0.081 -0.75% -2.30% -0.959
2 -0.67% -2.11% 0.162 -0.72% -2.68% 0.377 -0.71% -2.37% -0.659 -0.80% -3.10% -1.206
3 -0.10% -2.21% 0.841 -0.25% -2.93% 1.053 -0.75% -3.12% -0.906 -0.68% -3.78% 0.274
4 -0.51% -2.72% 0.037 -0.54% -3.47% -0.555 0.53% -2.59% 1.068 0.55% -3.23% 1.014
5 -0.53% -3.25% -1.571 -0.43% -3.90% -1.626 -0.29% -2.88% -0.906 -0.27% -3.50% -0.713
6 -0.19% -3.44% -0.767 -0.24% -4.14% -1.626 -0.27% -3.15% -1.153 -0.34% -3.84% -2.193**
7 0.02% -3.42% 0.573 0.09% -4.05% 1.053 0.19% -2.96% 2.302** 0.18% -3.66% 1.508
8 -0.38% -3.80% 0.037 -0.47% -4.52% -0.287 -0.36% -3.32% -0.906 -0.38% -4.04% -0.466
9 0.02% -3.78% -0.499 0.00% -4.52% -0.287 -0.53% -3.85% -0.659 -0.58% -4.62% -0.959
10 0.04% -3.74% -0.499 0.08% -4.44% -0.555 0.03% -3.82% -0.412 0.10% -4.52% -0.466
11 0.48% -3.26% -0.231 0.58% -3.86% 0.249 -0.69% -4.51% -0.659 -0.58% -5.10% -0.466
12 -0.15% -3.41% 1.109 -0.08% -3.94% 0.785 -0.09% -4.60% 0.575 -0.20% -5.30% -0.219
13 -0.86% -4.27% 0.037 -0.99% -4.93% 0.249 -0.34% -4.94% 0.575 -0.43% -5.73% 0.521
14 -0.43% -4.70% -0.767 -0.55% -5.48% -0.555 -0.18% -5.12% -0.412 -0.28% -6.01% -0.713
15 -0.14% -4.84% -0.767 -0.16% -5.64% -0.823 -0.31% -5.43% -1.401 -0.36% -6.37% -1.699*
30 0.10% -6.33% 0.037 0.02% -7.67% -0.287 0.28% -6.13% -0.311 0.28% -7.50% -0.85
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30,-2 -1.23% -0.108 -1.99% -0.649 -1.68% -0.434 -2.46% -0.434 -1.01% -0.051 -1.54% -0.549 -1.41% -0.353 -1.96% -0.602
-1,0 0.49% 0.432 0.49% 0.432 0.46% -0.434 0.45% -0.434 -0.07% -0.549 -0.08% -0.549 -0.16% -0.850 -0.17% -0.850
+1,+30 -5.57% -0.499 -6.22% -1.035 -6.46% -1.358 -7.20% -1.358 -5.08% -1.400 -5.71% -1.646* -5.95% -1.946* -6.63% -1.946*
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels of significance.
FF3FM FF4FM FF3FM FF4FM
This table reports the results of an event study on the three-tiered listing structure for the NASDAQ Stock Exchange, specifically focusing on firms that dropped from a higher tier to a lower tier GSM to NGM, or NGM to NCM.  The Announcement Date columns report the average 
and cumulative abnormal returns for the sample firms based on the date of the company's initial press release or SEC filing announcing the move.  The Effective Date columns report the average and cumulative abnormal returns for the date the firms began trading on the lower tier.  
FF3FM represents calculations of abnormal returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model.  FF4FM represents calculations of abnormal returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model, plus the Carhart Momentum Factor.
Panel A: Announcement Date n=76 Panel B: Effective Date n=84
Day
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Table 2-6: Event Study Results, Stocks Moving to Lower Tier.  
 
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Mean Abnormal 
Return
Cumulative 
Abnormal
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30 1.32% 1.32% 0.648 1.28% 1.28% 0.177 -0.42% -0.42% 0.143 -0.47% -0.47% 0.178
-15 -0.10% 1.25% -0.141 -0.02% 1.89% -0.086 1.22% 3.45% 1.129 1.06% 3.55% 1.657**
-14 -0.52% 0.73% -0.667 -0.81% 1.08% -0.349 -0.66% 2.79% -0.35 -0.80% 2.75% -0.808
-13 -0.66% 0.07% -0.667 -0.70% 0.38% -1.138 -1.59% 1.20% -0.103 -1.71% 1.04% -0.315
-12 -1.16% -1.09% 0.385 -1.44% -1.06% -0.086 1.14% 2.34% 1.129 1.12% 2.16% 1.164
-11 1.18% 0.09% 0.648 1.01% -0.05% 0.703 0.68% 3.02% -0.596 0.73% 2.89% -0.068
-10 1.40% 1.49% 0.122 1.55% 1.50% 0.44 -0.72% 2.30% -0.35 -0.52% 2.37% -0.068
-9 -1.03% 0.46% -0.93 -0.91% 0.59% -0.875 0.63% 2.93% 1.376* 0.66% 3.03% 0.918
-8 -0.37% 0.09% 2.225** -0.28% 0.31% 2.282** -0.68% 2.25% -0.103 -0.57% 2.46% 0.425
-7 0.40% 0.49% 1.962** 0.48% 0.79% 2.019** 1.62% 3.87% 0.636 1.39% 3.85% 0.918
-6 2.18% 2.67% 1.173 2.02% 2.81% 1.23 2.33% 6.20% 0.39 2.10% 5.95% 0.178
-5 0.64% 3.31% -0.93 0.44% 3.25% -1.138 0.45% 6.65% 0.39 0.51% 6.46% 0.178
-4 -0.03% 3.28% 0.648 -0.02% 3.23% 0.703 0.08% 6.73% 0.39 0.02% 6.48% 0.178
-3 1.49% 4.77% 0.91 1.50% 4.73% 1.23 -0.82% 5.91% 0.636 -0.79% 5.69% 0.918
-2 -0.60% 4.17% -0.667 -0.55% 4.18% -0.086 0.33% 6.24% 1.376* 0.30% 5.99% 1.411*
-1 0.74% 4.91% 0.385 0.63% 4.81% 0.703 0.41% 6.65% 0.636 0.52% 6.51% 0.178
0 1.12% 4.91% 1.436* 1.30% 4.91% 1.493* 0.04% 4.91% -0.103 0.12% 4.91% -0.068
1 0.11% 5.02% -0.141 0.12% 5.03% -0.086 0.30% 5.21% 0.39 0.34% 5.25% 0.918
2 -0.11% 4.91% -0.93 -0.20% 4.83% -0.612 0.58% 5.79% 0.636 0.45% 5.70% 0.671
3 0.63% 5.54% 1.699** 0.54% 5.37% 2.019** 0.91% 6.70% -0.103 0.97% 6.67% 0.178
4 0.47% 6.01% 0.385 0.72% 6.09% 0.967 0.91% 7.61% 0.636 1.01% 7.68% 0.918
5 1.94% 7.95% 2.225** 1.99% 8.08% 1.756** 2.34% 9.95% 3.594*** 2.51% 10.19% 3.383***
6 0.75% 8.70% 0.91 0.90% 8.98% 1.23 0.24% 10.19% 0.636 0.11% 10.30% 0.425
7 -0.68% 8.02% 0.385 -0.78% 8.20% 0.703 2.22% 12.41% 1.869** 2.24% 12.54% 1.904**
8 2.92% 10.94% 1.699** 2.98% 11.18% 2.019** 1.04% 13.45% 1.622* 1.21% 13.75% 2.150**
9 0.13% 11.07% 0.385 0.17% 11.35% 1.23 0.13% 13.58% -0.35 0.13% 13.88% -1.054
10 -1.28% 9.79% -0.141 -1.25% 10.10% -0.612 -0.20% 13.38% -0.103 -0.27% 13.61% 0.178
11 -0.48% 9.31% 0.385 -0.63% 9.47% 0.177 -2.16% 11.22% -0.103 -2.28% 11.33% -0.068
12 2.29% 11.60% 0.648 2.15% 11.62% 0.967 0.80% 12.02% -0.103 0.93% 12.26% -0.315
13 -1.13% 10.47% -0.93 -1.22% 10.40% -0.612 -0.83% 11.19% -0.234 -0.86% 11.40% 0.297
14 0.54% 11.01% 1.044 0.63% 11.03% 0.835 0.66% 11.85% 0.014 0.59% 11.99% 0.297
15 0.08% 11.09% 1.044 0.01% 11.04% 0.835 -1.06% 10.79% 0.759 -1.04% 10.95% 1.042
30 -0.06% 18.42% 0.78 0.03% 19.15% 0.834 -0.65% 16.67% 0.889 -0.57% 17.33% 1.181
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
Compound 
Abnormal 
Return
Generalized
Signed
Z-statistic
-30,-2 4.17% 1.436* 0.55% 0.648 4.17% 1.493* 0.57% 0.967 6.23% 2.362*** 2.98% 0.883 6.01% 1.532* 2.72% 0.918
-1,0 1.86% 1.173 1.98% 1.173 1.93% 1.23 2.05% 1.23 0.45% 1.376* 0.45% 0.883 0.64% 0.622 0.64% 0.918
+1,+30 13.26% 2.488*** 11.58% 1.699** 13.94% 2.808*** 12.36% 1.756** 11.75% 2.854*** 9.54% 0.636 12.34% 3.095*** 10.20% 0.425
FF3FM FF4FM FF3FM FF4FM
This table reports the results of an event study on the three-tiered listing structure for the NASDAQ Stock Exchange, specifically focusing on firms that dropped from a higher tier to a lower tier (GSM to NGM, or NGM to NCM).  The Announcement Date  columns report the 
average and cumulative abnormal returns for the sample firms based on the date of the company's initial press release or SEC filing announcing the move.  The Effective Date  columns report the average and cumulative abnormal returns for the date the firms began trading on the 
lower tier.  FF3FM represents calculations of abnormal returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model.  FF4FM represents calculations of abnormal returns using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model, plus the Carhart Momentum Factor.
Panel A: Announcement Date (n=68) Panel B: Effective Date (n=74)
Day
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Table 2-7: Descriptive Statistics, 2004-2008 IPO Market. 
 
Pre-Reorg Post-Reorg
29.2% 135 NYSE 111 32.6%
2.8% 13 AMEX 17 5.0%
67.7% 313 NASDAQ 205 60.1%
0.2% 1 NYSE Arca 8 2.3%
462 341  
 
 
 
Table 2-8: Correlations. 
 
NASDAQ 
IPO Ln(MktCap)
NASDAQ 
Industry 
Share
Returns
NASDAQ IPO 1
Ln(MktCap) -0.35363 1
<.0001***
NASDAQ Industry Share 0.42247 -0.18078 1
<.0001*** <.0001***
Returns 0.2321 -0.1199 0.32516 1
<.0001*** 0.0007*** <.0001***
Post Reorg -0.07884 0.06932 0.11691 0.16855
0.0255** 0.0496** 0.0011*** <.0001***
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels of significance.  
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Table 2-9: Probit and Logit Estimations, IPO Market. 
Independent Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6
 -0.8072 -0.7958 11.9264 -14.2994 -14.0626 21.143
Wald c2 54.57*** 52.02*** 58.25*** 53.5363*** 50.7312*** 51.3072***
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Ln(MktCap) -0.4366 -0.4267 -0.6275 -0.7771 -0.7584 -1.1136
Wald c2 64.1202*** 60.13*** 63.83*** 62.4956*** 58.3535*** 56.4259***
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
NASDAQ Industry Share 1.7067 1.8200 1.8177 2.8699 3.0458 3.0216
Wald c2 84.4871*** 91.64*** 89.98*** 77.2396*** 83.061*** 80.6329***
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
sReturns 3.3866 4.5624 4.6886 7.9698 9.7142 9.3679
Wald c2 5.1942** 8.81*** 9.11*** 8.1631*** 11.6969*** 10.923***
p-value 0.0227 0.0030 0.0025 0.0043 0.0006 0.0009
Ln(MktCap)*Post Reorg 0.4269 0.7429
Wald c2 14.79*** 13.5003***
p-value 0.0001 0.0002
Post Reorg -0.4522 -8.9051 -0.7219 -15.4656
Wald c2 17.97*** 16.36*** 15.4855*** 14.7996***
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001
n 803 803 803 803 803 803
Log Likelihood 409.765*** 400.646*** 393.199***
Likelihood Ratio 231.678*** 247.585*** 261.309***
Score 207.586*** 218.909*** 227.098***
Wald 162.035*** 167.377*** 171.417***
Psuedo r2 0.258 0.272 0.281 0.258 0.272 0.281
Dependent variable: NASDAQ  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO listed on NASDAQ, and equal to 0 otherwise.
Independent variables:  Ln(MktCap)  is the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization, defined as the number of publicly 
traded shares times share price.  NASDAQ Industry Share is the proportion of industry peers listed on NASDAQ.  Standard 
Deviation of Returns (sreturns) is the standard deviation of the market closing price for the first 100 days of trading immediately after 
the firm's IPO.  Post Reorg  is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the IPO listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX between July 3, 2006 
and 31 December, 2008.
LogitProbit
*, **, * ** denotes statistical significance at the .1, .05, and .01 level. 
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Figure 2-1: Optimal Listing Standards (With Lower Tier). 
  
 
Figure 2-2: Optimal Listing Standards (With Higher Tier). 
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Figure 2-3: GSM, Post-Announcement Window. 
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Figure 2-4: GSM, Full 61-Day Event Window. 
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Figure 2-5: NGM, Post-Announcement Window. 
Global Market (Event Study Results, Cumulative Abnormal Return)
-6.00%
-4.00%
-2.00%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Event Day
Pe
rc
en
t
Press Release Date
Identification Date
Effective Date
 
 
Figure 2-6: NGM, Full 61-Day Event Window. 
Global Market (Event Study Results, Cumulative Abnormal Return)
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Figure 2-7: GSM vs. NGM, Full 61-Day Event Window. 
Global vs. Global Select Market (Event Study Results, Cumulative Abnormal Return)
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Figure 2-8:  Risers vs. Drops, Full 61-Day Event Window. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
1 2 3 1 2 3
Pre-tax earnings
Aggregate in prior three 
fiscal years > $11M
&
Two most recent fiscal 
years > $2.2M
&
Each of the prior 3 fiscal 
years > $0
n/a n/a $1M n/a n/a $.75M
1
(Net income)
Cash flows n/a
Aggregate in prior 3 
fiscal years > $27.5M
&
Each of the prior 3 
fiscal years > $0
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Market capitalization n/a Average > $550M 
over prior 12 months
Average > $850M over 
prior 12 months
n/a n/a n/a $50M1
Revenue n/a
Previous fiscal year > 
$110M
Previous fiscal year > 
$90M n/a n/a n/a n/a
Minimum bid price $4.00
Minimum market makers 3 3 4 3
Stockholders' Equity $15M $30M n/a $5M1
Operating history n/a 2 years n/a n/a
Corporate governance Yes
Beneficial shareholders
or
Beneficial shareholders
and Avg mo vol over past 12 mos
300
(round lot
holders)
Publicly held shares 1M
Market value of public shares 
or
Market value of public shares and 
Shareholders’ equity
$8M $18M $20M n/a
Market value of listed securities
or
Total assets and Total revenue
n/a n/a
$75M
or
$75M and 
$75M
n/a
n/a
3
1 - Denotes Capital Market companies must meet one of these three criteria.
L
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
 
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
2,200
or
400
(round lot
holders)
1.25M 1.1M
$110 million
or
$100 million and $110 million
n/a
CapitalRequirements
Global Select Global
$5.00 $5.00
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
Yes Yes
n/a
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APPENDIX B 
 
Standard 1 Standard 2 Standard 1 Standard 2 Standard 1 Standard 2 Standard 3
Stockholders’ equity $10,000,000 N/A $10,000,000 N/A $2,500,000 N/A N/A
Market value of listed securities N/A $50,000,000 N/A $50,000,000 N/A $35,000,000 N/A
or or or
Total assets and total revenue $50m and $50m $50m and $50m N/A N/A $500,000
Publicly held shares 750,000 1,100,000 750,000 1,100,000 500,000 500,000 500,000
Market value of publicly held shares $5,000,000 $15,000,000 $5,000,000 $15,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000
Bid price $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1
Shareholders (round lot holders) 400 400 400 400 300 300 300
Market makers 2 4 2 4 2 2 2
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GSM GM CM
 
 
Continued Listing Standards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
VITA 
 
 
 
Kevin Broom was born and raised in Shreveport, Louisiana.  After receiving his 
Bachelor of General Studies from Louisiana State University in Shreveport in 1992, he 
earned a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army Medical 
Department.  After serving six years in the Army’s rapid deployment forces, to include 
serving as a Company Commander in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), he 
earned an opportunity to attend the Defense Comptroller Program at Syracuse University 
where he earned a Master of Business Administration in 2000.  After a one-year 
internship, and a two-year assignment as a Chief Financial Officer for an Army hospital, 
the Army selected him to attend a fully funded Ph.D. program in a business discipline.  
Subsequently, he took advantage of this academic opportunity by coming to the 
University of Mississippi in order to pursue a Ph.D. in Business Administration - 
Finance.  Currently, he continues to serve in the Army Medical Department as a 
Lieutenant Colonel, teaching graduate-level finance.  He is married to Polly Anne Morse 
and has five children, Alexander, Jackson, Amanda, Jonah, and Lydia. 
